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Competition law, both at national
level and at EC level, regulates – 
among other things – agreements 
between companies that have the
purpose or the effect of restricting
competition.
While in itself cooperation between 
companies to enhance supply
chain efficiency and, more broadly, 
to develop competitive industry
clusters does not give rise to com-
petition law concerns –and may 
indeed help to reinvigorate compe-
tition– the existence and nature of 
such cooperation may be misinter-
preted or not fully understood by
competition authorities, or indeed 
may be open to abuse.
For this reason it is important when 
considering any form of coop-
eration to ensure (i) the compat-
ibility of individual strategies with
competition law and (ii) that these 
strategies are described and com-
municated in a clear way that limits 
any possible misunderstanding as
to their nature and intent.
Broadly speaking, it can be
observed that the key objective
of rules against anticompetitive
agreements is that companies
should act independently. This 
of course does not mean that 
any form of common action is
excluded. It does, however, imply 
that where cooperation is envis-
aged, the intention should not be
to dampen rivalry between firms.
It is therefore important that the
efficiency or competition enhanc-
ing intent behind cooperation be
clearly identified at the outset.
Moreover, the concrete effects on 
competition of cooperation should
be carefully weighed up. Do the
increased efficiency, improved
customer service and/or techno-
logical advances promised by a
certain cooperative strategy out-
weigh the possible loss of rivalry 
between firms working together on
a project?
Clearly, the compatibility of 
specific cooperative agreements 
with competition law ultimately 
requires a case by case approach.
However, the following general ob-
servations can be made. Generally
6
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speaking, competition authorities 
will be more concerned about:
U “Horizontal” cooperation than 
“vertical” cooperation;
U Cooperation involving (even ex-
changes of information on) key 
parameters of competition such 
as price or output;
U Cooperation between players in 
concentrated sectors or coop-
eration involving many players in 
a sector.
In addition to assuring themselves 
that a particular course of conduct 
is indeed compatible with com-
petition law, companies must also 
ensure that their assessments are 
carefully documented. Rigorous 
documentation and document 
retention policies are therefore 
key. Clear records must be kept, 
for example, of the reasoning 
behind strategies adopted and any 
meetings concerning them, the 
assessment of the effects of those 
strategies and why the company 
considers them to be compatible 
with competition law. Paper trails 
clearly showing the good will and 
intentions of the companies in-
volved in cooperative agreements 
are important elements of evi-
dence in the event that breaches 
of competition law are alleged at a 
later date.
Finally, it is emphasized that – in 
accordance with competition 
law – the present report is not 
intended as a “shopping list” or set 
of recommendations to industry, 
but aims to identify the great 
efficiencies that can be derived 
from the development of effi-
cient supply chain management 
and strong economic clusters 
more generally. Ultimately, it is 
up to each company to decide 
individually upon its own best 
business strategy.
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1. MANAGEMENT SUMMARY
With the attention of the chemical indus-
try focused on exploiting the low cost
feedstocks in the Middle East and the 
growth markets of Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South East Asia, this report 
provides a timely reminder to policy
makers, chemical companies and logis-
tics service providers of the significant 
opportunities for improving business 
potential in Europe’s chemical clusters. 
Europe is still the largest, most sophisti-
cated global market for chemical prod-
ucts, with a well developed, efficient, 
highly productive asset base, sound 
infrastructure, leading edge research and 
development and significant purchasing
power. Provided these advantages are 
sustained, including continued attention
to asset maintenance and operational 
and supply chain improvements, Europe 
can remain a competitive force in the
global market place, despite what the 
doom-mongers may say to the contrary.
The EPCA Supply Chain Think Tank
reports of 2004 and 2005 concluded that
there is a huge potential to be achieved 
through collaboration between produc-
ers, customers, suppliers and service
providers to drive out waste and cost. 
Recommendations were made to:
U Actively promote the conclusions of 
the Think Tank working groups in order
to change attitudes and perceptions of 
the industry.
U Alert entrepreneurial stakeholders to
the business opportunities.
U Develop research connections with
universities and institutions.
U Continue with the working group 
activities where there are areas for 
further discussion and development.
As a consequence it was proposed that
the successful Think Tank model be
maintained, comprising senior stake-
holders and decision-makers, to study
supply chain collaboration in chemical 
clusters in Europe. During the first half 
of 2007, under the sponsorship of the 
EPCA Board, 53 senior representatives 
of chemical companies, logistics service
providers, public authorities and institu-
tions, together with researchers from IN-
SEAD, engaged in this study. The Think
Tank was chartered to test the conclu-
sions from previous think tanks, identify
working examples of cooperation (suc-
cesses as well as opportunities for
improvement and missed opportunities), 
develop ideas to overcome constraints
and stimulate future supply chain col-
laboration initiatives, using the examples 
of Tarragona and Antwerp/Rotterdam/
Rhine-Ruhr (ARRR). Although each of 
the components of ARRR are clusters 
in themselves, the integration through 
pipelines, waterways, rail and roads as
well as the intensity of the exchanges
between them encouraged the Think
Tank to explore this as one mega-cluster.
The work of the Think Tank has culmi-
nated in the production of this report.
Tank train, Marl Chemical Park, ChemSite
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There is general agreement that, while
progress has been made – and case
studies illustrating this view are included 
in the report –, there are both op-
portunities and threats for the future 
growth and added value of the clus-
ters which will require the attention 
of public policy makers and senior 
management in the industry. Much
of the cluster development to date has 
been driven by individual rather than col-
lective initiatives. The long-term health
of a cluster requires adequate infra-
structure and sustainable mobility, but
also a strategic view on supply chains.
To achieve the latter, more attention 
should be paid to creating the right 
conditions for successful end-to-end 
supply chain collaboration. Whereas 
the integral supply chain perspective has
become a successful reality in sectors
like consumer electronics and automo-
biles, it has barely surfaced in the chemi-
cal industry.
The Think Tank discussions showed 
that the concept of chemical clusters,
with the associated dynamics and sup-
ply chain value proposition, receives 
increasing attention on Board meeting 
agendas and by senior manage-
ment, but a paradigm shift has not 
come true yet. Despite the fact that
some 8-10% of total industry turnover
is spent on supply chain and logistics
activities, representing more than 37% of 
total value-added, many investment and
operational decisions are taken remotely,
without necessarily exploring all the supply 
chain opportunities within the cluster (*).
It is generally acknowledged that supply
chain excellence can deliver lower unit
costs, higher capital productivity (ROCE), 
improved service and reduction of carbon
emissions. With capital investments in the
chemical industry often having a lifetime 
of 30-40 years, it appears prudent to 
ensure that such supply chain benefits 
and the associated competitiveness can
be obtained over the life of the project. 
This report explores and illustrates how
these benefits are being achieved through 
cluster arrangements, but, more impor-
tant, how many opportunities still remain 
unexploited. Recommendations are made
on how this can be improved it being
understood that decisions must be taken 
by each individual company in full compli-
ance with competition rules.
Research by INSEAD, conducted
through interviews with key industry
leaders and subsequently discussed 
inside the Think Tanks, has identified 
many drivers, as well as blockers, 
which impact cluster growth. These 
are discussed in detail in the body of the
report, and the reader is urged to explore
the interviews and Think Tank results in 
Chapter 4. On the basis of these results 
the Think Tank has derived four recom-
mendations for companies acting in 
the clusters.
(*) Cefic ‘Horizon: 2015: Perspectives for the European Chemical Industry’ Brussels, March 2004.
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Information sharing is key.
The interviews have shown that many
opportunities to benefit from chemi-
cal clusters are missed because each
cluster stakeholder (producer, Logistics
Service Provider (LSP) or authority) has
only a partial view of the flows proc-
essed. Compared to chemical clusters
in the rest of the world, it is surprisingly 
difficult to obtain even basic aggregate
information on European chemical clus-
ters. Consequently, initiatives to build
cluster-wide infrastructure solutions or 
even merge shipments from different 
companies are very difficult to under-
take. Without a certain level of structured 
and available information accessible 
to all partners, firms will value invest-
ments in the cluster with a higher risk or
might even invest in the wrong alterna-
tive. Thus, to ensure that the competi-
tive forces still work to the benefit of all
cluster members, information sharing is 
key and should go beyond exchanging
forecasts between business partners.
Clearly, any information exchange must 
be done in full compliance with competi-
tion rules.
A flexible discussion platform 
is required to organize 
information sharing and 
coordinate cluster initiatives.
Considering the constraints of the chem-
ical industry with respect to competition 
law as well as the fact that firms operate
independently, we recommend the 
12
in this report, the study has shown that
a significant gap between words and 
facts still exists. Although producers are 
very knowledgeable about the benefits 
of going beyond arm’s length relation-
ships with LSPs, the interviews highlight 
the limits in practice. Frequent tendering
practices with limited information shar-
ing reduces planning visibility for service
providers and result in a high cost posi-
tion for producers.
This report is a demonstration of con-
fidence in the future of the European
chemical industry, but recommends
policy makers, local authorities and 
industry leaders to be alert to the op-
portunities and to the need for effective 
lean logistics and efficient supply chain
economics to help sustain this com-
petitive advantage. Although individual
companies will continue to pursue their
own self-interest, the report urges the 
establishment of local chemical industry
platforms, represented by all stakehold-
ers, to explore these opportunities in 
more detail.
Leveraging these supply chain oppor-
tunities through intensive collabora-
tion within and between clusters will 
go a long way to ensuring the con-
tinued competitiveness of Europe’s 
chemical industry.
creation of a flexible discussion platform 
to coordinate the information gather-
ing at a supply chain level and to create
common knowledge. This platform 
should be opened to producers, LSPs
and authorities (state, region, port/
cluster authority) who have the power 
to exchange ideas and opinions on the 
basis of the information gathered.
Take actions to solve current 
cluster issues.
The value of the cluster platform will be
demonstrated as soon as actions start 
to be launched under its initiative. The 
platform will be an especially important
communication channel when it comes
to discussing ways to improve cluster
performance. Infrastructure shortages
or congestion problems are topics that
have to be solved collaboratively, taking 
into account the complexity of the inter-
dependencies between stakeholders in
the cluster. For the ARRR mega-cluster, 
a working group should be dedicated to
the harmonization of the legislation and
supply chain practices between compa-
nies and the three countries. No platform 
currently exists that brings companies 
together to address such issues.
The paradigm shift on collabo-
rations has not taken place.
Despite the various examples provided
VCM’s production
plant, Tarragona, 
Ercros
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2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 European Chemical Industry – 
A Major Force under Threat?
From food packaging to pharmaceuti-
cals, the chemical industry plays a domi-
nant role in today’s national and global 
economies. Developing and sustaining a 
local chemical industry, able to compete 
on a global scale, has both economic 
and political importance as the chemi-
cal industry supplies the full spectrum 
of Europe’s manufacturing industry with 
intermediate products.
In 2006 the European chemical industry 
comprised more than 30,000 firms, 
directly employed 1.9 million workers, 
and generated 2% of Europe’s gross 
national product (Source: Eurostat, 
2007). Recent studies performed in the 
Rhine/Ruhr region indicate that one job 
in the chemical industry creates three 
additional jobs in the chemical-related 
sector.
Since 1990 the European chemical 
industry has been growing at an average 
rate of 2.8% per year, outstripping the 
European manufacturing industry which 
has grown by 1.6% in the same period. 
At the end of 2006 the industry had de-
livered a positive trade surplus of E 41.0 
billion, up by 6% compared with 2005. 
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Figure 2-1 Extra-EU chemicals trade balance (Eurostat, 2007)
Therefore, the European chemical 
industry has been, and will remain, 
a leading factor in economic 
growth, warranting specific atten-
tion from policy makers.
Despite these positive numbers, there 
are signals that the growth and export 
potential of the European chemical in-
dustry could be under threat. Agricultural
chemicals and fibers have experienced 
negative growth, the trade surplus for 
organic chemicals has declined in the 
face of increased import flows from 
Saudi Arabia, and despite a strong 
performance from polyolefins, huge new 
petrochemical capacity in the Middle
East will inevitably impact demand for 
European sourced production.
European companies have of course 
contributed to the development of com-
peting clusters closer to emerging mar-
kets (China/India) and cheap feedstocks 
in the Middle East. Although much of 
the new production is expected to find 
a home in Asian markets, there is a 
concern that European competitiveness 
will suffer as companies prefer to invest 
scarce financial resources in growing 
regions, and allow the European asset 
base to become obsolete. Up-to-date
manufacturing assets as well as efficient 
and reliable logistics networks are a 
prerequisite for remaining competitive in 
global markets.
2.2 Clusters & Competitiveness
An Arthur D. Little study from 2005 – The
Staying Power of Europe’s Chemical In-
dustry – compared the production costs 
of Europe’s chemical sites to the US,
India, China, and the Middle East. While 
the report acknowledged that Europe 
may be expensive, the surprising conclu-
sion was that it still remains one of the 
most competitive regions in the world. 
The study challenges the hypothesis that 
significant relocation of European-based 
chemicals manufacturing operations 
is likely to happen in order to serve 
developing and developed markets at 
reduced cost.
The study conducted both a qualita-
tive and a cost based assessment of 
the operating environment in which a 
chemical company can deliver value. 
The four factors determining the quality 
of the environment were demand condi-
tions, technological advancement and 
innovation, environmental regulations, 
and the formation of clusters. With 
the exception of environmental regula-
tions for which the report underlined that 
“governments must improve cooperation 
with companies to develop environmen-
tal efficiency at low administrative cost”, 
all other factors are well established 
in Europe, including the presence of 
strongly integrated clusters.
14
The report observed that Europe enjoys 
the benefit of a limited number of 
strongly clustered areas. With raw mate-
rials being the main input to the chemi-
cals industry, their immediate availability 
through ports, refineries, and pipelines is 
of prime importance, as well as the op-
portunity to develop derivative products 
at the lowest possible logistics cost.
It should be clear that the continued 
global competitiveness of European 
chemical manufacturing is closely 
linked to the efficiency of its clus-
ters. Chemical clusters are all about 
the supply chain at work.
The port and pipeline infrastructure 
facilitates upstream supply chain 
operations and economics. The high 
level of integration and interconnectivity 
between the cluster participants creates 
significant opportunities to benefit from 
efficiencies through reduced transporta-
tion intensity (i.e. lower freight costs, 
reduced risk from the movement of haz-
ardous products, reduced emissions), 
more effective utilization of assets, and 
efficient use of working capital.
The inevitable tension between com-
petition and collaboration has probably 
limited the full exploitation of these 
opportunities in the past. However, there 
is evidence of an increasing willingness 
to explore the scope and benefits of 
collaborative relationships, as a way of 
raising the bar on performance, without 
negatively impacting competition.
In addition, notwithstanding the fact 
that Europe has well-established and 
effective clusters in place, supported 
by highly sophisticated logistics service 
providers and supportive public authori-
ties, further benefits would be obtained 
by engaging all stakeholders in enhanc-
ing the linkage between clusters.
In this context EPCA took the initiative 
of conducting a more in-depth study of 
European chemical clusters.
2.3 The EPCA Study
Since European manufacturers cannot 
differentiate themselves through a cost 
advantage on feedstocks (versus Middle
Eastern producers), the integration of 
energy and intermediate raw materials 
as well as supply chain efficiencies rep-
resent key drivers for competitiveness. 
Previous studies from EPCA and CEFIC
have shown that 37% of the value added 
created by chemical companies can be 
spent on transforming, storing, and mov-
ing products.
The EPCA-CEFIC Think Tank Reports
issued in 2004 and 2005 concluded 
that a huge potential can be achieved 
15
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through collaboration between “custom-
ers, suppliers, service providers and, 
occasionally, competitors, to drive out 
waste, and hence cost”. The estimated 
accumulated potential in Europe from a 
range of proposed measures was up to 
E 15 billion.
The key recommendations suggested 
in these reports as “next steps” were 
centered on capturing supply chain 
collaboration opportunities, in various 
forms. The 2004 report explored pooling 
of resources, enhanced use of multi-
modal and multi-user terminals (hubs), 
and further exploitation of swaps and 
pipelines. The 2005 Report specifically 
encouraged more collaboration and 
information sharing to achieve improved 
asset utilization.
Consequently the successful Supply
Chain Think Tank model (comprising 
senior stakeholders and decision-makers 
representing producers, service provi-
ders, public institutions, and academia) 
was maintained in order to explore the 
opportunities offered by Europe’s chemi-
cal clusters in terms of supply chain 
efficiency and to identify to what extent 
cluster development can contribute to 
Europe’s long term competitiveness. 
Specifically, the study would test the 
conclusions of the previous think tanks, 
identify working examples of collabora-
tion as well as missed opportunities, 
develop ideas to overcome blockers and 
constraints and stimulate future supply 
chain collaborative initiatives.
The scope of the study, represented in 
Figure 2-2, is therefore at the interface 
between supply chain topics and cluster 
theory.
The Think Tank study was limited to an 
empirical investigation of two principal 
clusters; ARRR (Antwerp, Rotterdam, 
Rhine, Ruhr) and Tarragona. Although
traditionally the ARRR cluster has been 
viewed as separate individual clusters, 
the degree of interdependence, integra-
tion and infrastructure linkage encou-
raged EPCA to consider this as one 
mega-cluster. The ARRR group reflected 
this approach.
Following a brief generic presenta-
tion of chemical clusters and a more 
detailed description of the target clusters 
in chapter 3, the results of interviews 
conducted in the ARRR and Tarragona 
clusters will be presented in chapters 
4, including numerous case studies 
illustrating successful cluster-driven col-
laboration. The comparative governance 
structure of each cluster and the impact 
on cluster development will be reviewed 
in chapter 5, followed by conclusions 
and recommendations in chapter 6.
cluster
economics
economies of scale
economies of scope
share information
share assets
coordinate actionsproximity of customers/suppliers and competitors
scope of
EPCA study
supply chain
collaboration
Figure 2-2: Scope of the EPCA study
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3. PRESENTATION OF 
 THE ARRR AND TARRAGONA   
 CHEMICAL CLUSTERS
3.1 Definition of chemical clusters
Links between a specific industry and 
a geographic location can be easily 
observed in the economic map of the
world. For example, financial services
are related to the city of London, fashion 
to Milan and Paris and high-technology 
electronics to Silicon Valley. The chemi-
cal industry could be associated with
the area of Rotterdam, Antwerp and the
Rhine/Ruhr region, strongly sustained by 
the presence of 3 important ports (the 2
seaports of Antwerp and Rotterdam and
the inland port of Duisburg) and by the 
dense network of logistics interconnec-
tions in place.
The phenomenon of regional industry
concentration was explored by Alfred
Marshall as early as the 1920s (Marshall,
1920) with respect to the progressive
concentration of firms making and ma-
chining steel around Sheffield. The atten-
tion of the economic and political sphere 
on this phenomenon has continuously
increased since then, due especially 
to the recognition that such networks
would constitute an ultimate source of 
competitive advantage for an economy 
(Porter, 1990).
These localized industries that combine 
a high specialization with an unusual 
competitive success in a particular
field and a specific geographic location
represent what Michael Porter described 
in the 1990s as “clusters” (Porter, 1998).
According to more recent research (de
Langen, 2004), a cluster is defined as a 
“geographically limited concentration 
of mutually related business units, 
associations and public or private 
organizations centered on a specific 
economic focus”. This definition will
be extended in the following chapters to
match the specificities of the chemical
industry.
A chemical cluster, like other industrial
clusters, is characterized by a high 
concentration of manufacturing compa-
nies and service providers operating in
the chemical business. But the cluster
population consists also of associations
and public or private organizations that
participate in and are co-responsible for
creating a vibrant environment in terms 
of productivity, innovation and creation 
of new businesses. For example, in the 
chemical clusters examined by the Think 
Tank the relevant port authorities attract
new investors in the area and offer stra-
tegic land positions for specific business 
development in addition to dealing with 
traditional port activities. 
In the manufacturing stage of the value 
chain, the products of a company are 
the inputs for the manufacturing process 
of a company further downstream in 
the value chain. In addition, chemical
companies tend to outsource industry-
related services and therefore attract
waves of third party investments in 
warehousing, transportation, general 
services, waste treatment and disposal,
as well as a full range of utilities.
18
This interaction and interdependence 
between the firms in a cluster creates 
complementarities, synergies and a 
combination of skills and incentives 
that is hard to reproduce by competi-
tors operating on an isolated basis.
This aspect is the real strength of a clus-
ter and explains why many governments,
especially in Europe, are attempting to
promote the formation of local clusters.  
Figure 3-1 shows how chemical compa-
nies are integrated into the materials flow 
system from crude-oil to ethylene and
propylene and the C4 cut between BP’s
Gelsenkirchen sites and the companies
located in the ChemSite-Marl Chemical
Park in Germany. 
While the interaction between compa-
nies operating in subsequent stages 
of the value chain is almost essen-
tial for each company’s success, the
same might not be true for companies
operating in the same stage of the value 
chain. Companies operating in the same 
product or business segment in the
cluster could choose whether or not to 
collaborate.
However, the fact of being located in
a cluster offers unique opportunities 
for collaboration, even between rival 
firms. Optimizing capital investments, 
increasing the average utilization of 
assets, swapping capacities and ma-
terials and exchanging information are 
only a few examples of collaboration 
opportunities that can successfully 
take place in a cluster. The geographi-
cal proximity of firms within the cluster
and the possibility of having frequent
face-to-face interactions represent an 
ideal trigger for developing this kind of 
collaboration initiative.
CLUSTER
C4-Cut interactions in the Rhine/Ruhr cluster
BP’s Gelsenkirchen refinery obtains crude-oil feedstock via the 
crude-oil pipelines from Rotterdam and Wilhelmshaven. The re-
finery transforms this crude-oil into a range of products, among 
them naphtha, which is used as feedstock by the 2 crackers 
owned and operated by BP in Gelsenkirchen. These crackers 
produce, among others, ethylene, propylene and the C4 cut, 
which are feedstocks for chemical companies. 
Sabic Polyolefin located in the Gelsenkirchen site, uses ethylene 
and propylene from the crackers. BP’s sites are also connected 
to the ARG ethylene and the Rhine-Ruhr propylene grids to for-
ward what is not consumed locally. 
The C4 cut is used as feedstock for the production of a range 
of chemical products produced by several chemical companies 
located in the ChemSite-Marl Chemical Park.
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Figure 3-1 C4-Cut interactions within the Rhine/Ruhr cluster
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3.2.1 ARRR Cluster
Though Antwerp, Rotterdam, and the 
Rhine-Ruhr separately form clusters 
as defined in Section 2, the Think Tank 
decided to consider the whole of the 
region as one mega-cluster, hereafter 
referred to as ARRR.  Indeed, the inte-
gration, interconnectivity and product 
flow between the individual areas 
justify this approach notwithstanding 
the fact that ARRR is spread out over 
three EU member states.
The ARRR mega-cluster is the largest 
interconnected chemical production 
cluster in the world in terms of pro-
duction throughput. The mega-cluster 
is also the most integrated chemical 
production region in the world. The 
main clusters include the port areas 
of Antwerp in Belgium, of Rotterdam 
in The Netherlands,  and two major 
inland areas – Rhine/Ruhr in North 
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and the 
Ludwigshafen-Mannheim-Karlsruhe
area.
A number of “satellite” clusters are 
interconnected with these clusters. 
These include Terneuzen, Geleen/
Sittard, Feluy and Frankfurt. These 
satellite clusters have in common that 
they are highly dependent on the clus-
ters in order to be successful, as they 
lack the manufacturing depth to be 
self-sufficient. The interconnections 
3.2 Presentation of the ARRR and 
Tarragona clusters
On the basis of the previous EPCA 
reports, the Think Tank decided to 
investigate to what extent firms 
actually benefit from the supply chain 
optimization opportunities provided 
by chemical clusters. For the sake of 
consistency, the Think Tank decided 
to limit its scope to Northern Europe 
(i.e. Antwerp, Rotterdam and Rhine/
Ruhr - ARRR) as well as Tarragona 
(Spain), leaving other significant clus-
ters out of the analysis.
In the following subsection, the historical 
evolution and uniqueness of each of the 
clusters mentioned will be described.
Figure 3-2 Main chemical clusters in 
Northern Europe
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between the clusters and surround-
ing satellite clusters include pipeline, 
waterways, rail and road, enabling a 
sophisticated and highly efficient sup-
ply chain management.
The Antwerp/Rotterdam and Rhine/Ruhr
clusters are connected via ethylene pipe-
lines passing through the SABIC satellite 
cluster in Geleen. The propylene pipeline 
connection between both regions (EPDC
project) has not taken place for reasons 
mentioned in Section 4 (see caselet in 
Section 4.1.4).
Figure 3-3 Overview of cluster interrelationships
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The right bank kept growing between 
1966 and 1971 with major investments
from BASF (1966), Bayer, Monsanto and
Solvay (all 1967) and Degussa (1970).
The growth dynamics of BASF’s inte-
grated Antwerp site attracted Air Liquide
which in 1971 signed one of the first co-
siting agreements in the Port of Antwerp.
The remaining areas were leased step by 
step in 1972 to Dow-Halterman, Rhône
Poulenc (at present these facilities are
owned by Katoen Natie) and Bayer, fol-
lowed by Aqualon in 1979. 
The cluster experienced a growth phase 
between 1979 and 1987 without signifi-
cant new settlements. Subsequently, 
during the period between 1987 and 
2006, the port of Antwerp benefited 
from the arrival of additional manufactur-
ers such as North Sea Petrochemicals 
(Shell/Borealis), INEOS Phenol (at the 
time Phenolchemie), as well as, from 
1999 onward, Japanese companies
(Kuraray, Nippon Shokubai and Tokyo
Kasei Europe).
The Port of Antwerp encompasses 
a wide range of the chemical value 
chain, as illustrated in Figure 3-5.
Antwerp subcluster
The Antwerp chemical cluster, located 
in the Port of Antwerp, covers more 
than 3,650 hectares along the Schelde 
River. Antwerp strongly developed as a
classical trading port in the 19th century,
and the petrochemical industry only 
emerged in the 1930s with the construc-
tion of two refineries. Chemical produc-
tion in Antwerp really took off after the
Second World War when two additional 
refineries and the first ethylene oxide
production facility started in 1951 at the
Marshall dock.
Between 1951 and 1963, the first series
of investments in downstream refinery
products emerged on the right bank
(Figure 3-4), leading to the extension of 
the historical docks up to the Zandvliet 
lock, and to the opening of the Boudew-
ijn lock. Joint investment in two steam
crackers and corresponding ethylene 
processing capacities (at the time 500K 
tons) in 1963 clearly made the Port
of Antwerp an increasingly chemical-
focused cluster. By that time, Union
Carbide Belgium and Amoco Fina had
already opened up their factories in the 
port in order to exploit the by-products 
of the refineries. 1963 was also the year
when the left bank of the port began to 
be exploited by Bayer Rubber (at the
time Polysar Belgium), subsequently
followed by five chemical multinationals
by 1970, among others 3M and Exxon
Mobil (at the time USI Europe).
Figure 3-4 Port of Antwerp - geographical 
overview
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Figure 3-5 Value chain of the Antwerp cluster (red items are produced, grey items 
are not produced, in the cluster)
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replaced coal during the war), industry 
and society. Oil had to be imported 
from other world regions and Rotterdam
quickly became the biggest European
port of oil imports.
The oil refineries of Shell and Caltex
(Texaco) started the cluster just after the 
Second World War. In the sixties, crude
oil pipelines to refineries in Germany
and Antwerp were commissioned. This
decade also saw the first big wave of 
chemical investments: Dow, Akzo, ICI
(now Hexion), Esso Chemicals, Kemira 
and Arco (now Lyondell) all set up their
plants. Since the petroleum trade con-
tinued to grow tremendously quick in the 
sixties, shipbuilders had to increase the 
capacity of their vessels. However, the 
new “mammoth” tankers were not able
to enter the existing port infrastructures. 
Consequently, the Europoort zone was 
built to the west of the port; it was 20 
Rotterdam subcluster
Rotterdam, initially a fishing village in the 
15th century, was already a significant 
gateway to the European hinterland
before the rise of the industrial revolu-
tion, due to regular trade lines to Asia
and South America (for tobacco and 
spices). Fueled by the rise of the Ger-
man steel industry in the Ruhr region, 
Rotterdam became through its access
to the Rhine River the port of choice for 
importing ores for the German factories 
and exporting steel products. In order 
to cope with higher traffic and heavier 
loads, access to the port was improved 
by a new channel (“Nieuwe Waterweg”) 
and the port was extended stepwise 
towards the sea.
After the First World War, with the grow-
ing use of automobiles, oil became a 
strategic resource for armies (oil had 
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meters deep and had three additional 
refineries. The logistics facilities kept 
pace with the construction of several 
tank storage terminals, working both for 
the industry and for companies using 
them as entry or exit points for Europe. 
Barges, railways, trucks and pipelines 
took care of the transport to and from 
the hinterland and within the port area.
Over time, the port kept on growing 
westward with more chemical plants and 
service companies, and the decision 
was taken to extend the port by 
reclaiming land from the sea. This gave 
birth to the Maasvlakte in 1973 (Figure 
3-6). In the nineties, several co-siting 
agreements were set up with industrial 
gases and combined heat and power 
producers (e.g. Eastman with Air Prod-
ucts and Eneco, ICI/Huntsman with Air
Liquide and Eneco).
As land became scarcer in the port in the 
last few years, more and more co-siting 
initiatives took place between chemical 
plants and tank storage companies, es-
pecially in biofuel production (BioPetrol 
at a Vopak terminal, Dutch Biodiesel at 
Argos and When Biofuels at Koole). 
The oil and chemical cluster within 
the Port of Rotterdam now comprises 
an extensive combination of crude oil 
refineries, chemical plants, industrial 
gases production, tank storage termi-
nals, pipeline connections and all kinds 
of service companies. In total it covers 
2,865 hectares, representing 60% of 
the available land in the port, with an 
emphasis on raw materials process-
ing and base chemicals manufactur-
ing (Figure 3-7) (pag 26).
Figure 3-6 Port of Rotterdam - graphical overview
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Figure 3-7 Value chain of the Rotterdam/Moerdijk cluster (green items are
produced, grey items are not produced in the cluster)
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Most of the chemical sites were run by 
one user only (single user sites) until 
the mid-1990s when chemical majors 
started to reorganize their product port-
folio. In the course of structural changes 
in the chemical industry, traditional 
chemical industry sites with single users 
were transformed into integrated multi-
user sites (chemical parks), where many 
users benefit from shared material flows 
and infrastructure, making efficient joint 
use of all the facilities available. The utili-
ties as well as the site management are 
mostly still performed by the initial user 
of the site (site operator). This structural 
change has created new opportunities, 
as each site is now even more focused 
on attracting complementary partners 
(manufacturers, LSPs, research centers) 
to create additional synergies within the 
chemical parks.
In the late nineties, some manufacturers 
of the cluster decided to merge their 
efforts in attracting new companies, 
triggered by the vision of the “opened 
chemical cluster” idea. The ChemSite 
initiative was created in 1997 as a public-
private partnership between the German 
state of North-Rhine-Westphalia and 
chemical manufacturers in the Northern 
Ruhr region promoting the attractiveness 
of the region. Hüls AG (now Degussa), 
which has been operating in Marl one 
of Germany’s biggest sites since 1938, 
founded ChemSite together with, among 
others, Veba Oel (now BP Refining & 
Petrochemicals), Rutgers Chemicals,
Rhine-Ruhr subcluster
The German state of North Rhine-
Westphalia is the base of two major 
chemical centers: the Ruhr region 
(ChemSite cluster) in the northern 
part and the Rhine area (ChemCo-
logne cluster) in the southern part. 
Together these chemical regions form 
the Rhine/Ruhr cluster. They are well 
connected by road, rail, pipeline and 
waterway, with Duisburg as the largest 
inland port in Europe. With 720 km of 
waterways, 180 inland ports and 8,000 
km of railways, the region is connected 
to both the raw material import centers 
or feedstock production sites (Rotter-
dam, Antwerp, Wilhelms-haven) and the 
German and Eastern European hinter-
land.
The chemical industry in the Rhine/Ruhr
cluster emerged in the 19th century 
with the exploitation of the neighboring 
coal reserves of the Ruhr. In a similar 
fashion as in Antwerp and Rotterdam, 
the development really took off after 
the Second World War when the former 
chemical group IG Farben was broken 
down into several units and petrochemi-
cal manufacturers installed refineries and 
steam crackers in the cluster (Rheinische
Olefinwerke GmbH in Wesseling, EC
Erölchemie in Worringen). This helped 
the cluster to maintain its long-term 
competitiveness by replacing the declin-
ing lignite and anthracite reserves by oil 
as an input for the chemical cluster. 
ChemSite currently promotes 7 sites,
from the fully integrated petro-chemical 
cluster operated by Degussa to the 
research focused cluster of TechnoMarl.
All chemical parks and sites are situated
very closely together in the Ruhr region. 
With a total area of 1,400 hectares, these 
locations offer about 240 hectares for
the relocation of new companies.
ChemCologne represents the counter-
part of ChemSite for the Cologne/
Leverkusen/Bonn region with the
biggest producers in terms of volume
being Bayer and its spin-offs, as well as 
Degussa. The range of its 150 members
spans classical manufacturers, logistics 
service providers and authorities; it also 
includes universities. Like ChemSite,
the sites represented (Figure 3-9) are 
promoted with the objective of attracting
new investors.
The chemical parks and sites in the 
Rhine/Ruhr cluster cover the whole 
chemical value chain with particu-
lar emphasis on base and specialty 
chemicals (see Figure 3-10). This 
emphasis is key when considering the 
potential provided by the high density of 
universities and chemical research cent-
ers in the vicinity.
DSM (now SABIC) and the state of 
North Rhine-Westphalia. Since then, 
the ChemSite initiative has successfully
extended to the whole Ruhr region.
Figure 3-8 
ChemSite cluster - 
graphical overview 
(source ChemSite, 
2007)
Figure 3-9 ChemCologne sites
(source ChemCologne, 2007)
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Figure 3-10 Value chain of the Ruhr cluster (orange items are produced, and grey items 
are not produced, in the cluster)
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300,000 intermodal units per year are
handled in the cluster.
3.2.2 Tarragona cluster
The Tarragona region is located 100 
km west of Barcelona, in the north-
east of Spain. The petrochemical cluster 
of Tarragona plays a major economic 
and social role in a region inhabited by 
some 500,000 people. Tarragona is the 
most important chemical manufactu-
ring cluster in the southern Europe 
and Mediterranean area. The global 
chemical production of the chemical 
companies in the Tarragona cluster 
amounts to 18 million tons per year,
25% of which is exported mainly to the
Mediterranean area. Approximately 44%
of the total plastics production in Spain
is produced in the cluster, thus confirm-
ing its leadership in the Mediterranean
area. The Tarragona chemical cluster is
the third largest producer of ethylene in 
Europe.
The economic success of the chemical
area depends on Tarragona Port, which
enables the import of raw materials and 
competitive feedstock for the chemical
manufacturing process. The total mari-
time traffic through the Port of Tarragona
amounts to about 35 million tons per 
year and the petroleum products (crude 
petroleum, naphtha, fuel oil, propane,
crude condensates, diesel) and chemical 
products represent around 50% with a
Rhine Main subcluster
This cluster consists of the Miro 
(Karlsruhe) refinery and petrochemi-
cals complex, the BASF Ludwigshafen 
Verbund site, and several smaller 
chemical sites including Raschig’s 
specialty chemical site in Ludwig-
shafen. The cluster receives primary raw
materials (crude oil and natural gas) via 
pipeline and depends on the Miro and
other European refineries for its primary
feedstock naphtha. The BASF Verbund 
site also currently receives naphtha
from Antwerp and Cologne via barge on 
the river Rhine. Other feedstocks and 
intermediates are transported by either 
rail or road.
In terms of overall volumes, the clus-
ter handles over 20 million tons of raw
materials per year and similar volumes of 
sales products. The Rhine Main cluster 
is the most integrated petrochemical, in-
termediates, polymers and performance 
materials cluster in Europe with over 200
production units producing more than
8,000 products (including brands and 
formulated products). 
All of the sites in the cluster have highly
integrated infrastructure, utilities, ser-
vice, waste management and logistics
systems serving to minimize their envi-
ronmental impact. Although significant 
volumes into and out of the cluster are 
conveyed by pipeline and barge, over
total of almost 18 million tons per year.
Since the 1960s, thirty-four companies 
including some major international ones 
like Bayer, BASF and Dow, and Repsol,
Spain’s largest petrochemical company, 
have set up production sites in the 
chemical cluster of Tarragona. 
The cluster consists of a northern and 
a southern area that are both linked to 
the port (Figure 3-11).
North industrial park covers 470 hec-
tares in the municipalities of La Pobla de 
Mafumet, El Morell, Constantí and Pera-
fort. It is a refinery and cracker based 
integrated petrochemical complex. 
The main players are Repsol and Dow 
Chemical Iberica.
South industrial park covers 717 hec-
tares in the municipalities of Tarragona, 
Vila-Seca and Reus. It is a multi-company 
intermediates, polymers and specialty 
chemicals site including Repsol, Dow 
Chemical Iberica, Bayer, BASF, Basell, 
Ercros and Solvay.
In the locations of Flix and Tortosa, 
about 100 km south of Tarragona, there 
are other smaller Ercros plants, produ-
cing chlorine, formaldehyde and deriva-
tives. Although well interconnected with 
the cluster in Tarragona, these plants are 
not part of it.
Figure 3-11 Tarragona’s chemical cluster consists of 
a South and a North industrial park linked to the port. 31
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sent from Bayer back to the Ercros plant
in Flix, where, combined with phosphoric 
rock received by train from the port of 
Tarragona, it is used for the production
of dicalcium phosphate.
The majority of the Tarragona chemical
cluster companies are members of the
Tarragona Chemical Business Associa-
tion (AEQT), which is, in turn, part of 
the national chemical trade association
FEIQUE. The main role of AEQT is to 
lobby the local, regional and national 
government with the aim of defending 
the interests of the chemical industry 
and to maintain and develop the chemi-
cal cluster’s reputation as a whole. AEQT
has participated with the local authorities 
in several projects, including the case
of assuring water supply from the Ebro
river, setting up a fire-fighting brigade
for all the companies in the cluster, and 
developing the rack of pipelines from 
the port to the southern industrial park 
(Dixquimics).
The main raw materials - crude oil and
natural gas - are all imported. Natural
gas is imported in the form of LNG and 
then processed in several gasification 
facilities along the coast around Barce-
lona and Cartagena. Natural gas is also 
provided via the Trans Pyrenean pipeline 
link Calahorra from Lacq in France, and
from the Maghreb-Europe Gas pipeline 
from Algeria to Spain.
25% of the Tarragona cluster’s produc-
tion is exported. The value chain, from 
raw materials and feedstocks to final 
products is depicted in Figure 3-12.
The value chain of the Tarragona cluster
is typical of a refinery-cracker based 
petro-chemical complex. Since the refin-
ery produces a typical “coastal” product 
slate, refinery residues are not gasified
to synthesis gas, resulting in no produc-
tion of C1 feedstocks or intermediates
in the cluster. Similarly the production of 
xylenes is also absent from the cluster.
There is a high integration between the 
companies in Tarragona, as one third of 
the products are used within the cluster
as input to other manufacturing stages.
Repsol and Dow, for instance, provide
ethylene via a 100 km long pipeline to
Solvay for its PVC manufacturing plant 
in Martorell. Ercros sends chlorine from
its plant in Flix both to the Ercros plant 
in Vila-Seca for the production of EDC/
VCM and to the Bayer plant for the pro-
duction of MDI. Hydrochloric acid is then
Terminal, Constantí - 
Tarragona, Katoen Natie
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Figure 3-12 Chemical value chain - Tarragona cluster. The products in orange are produced 
within the cluster, whereas the products in grey are not.
C1
C2
C3
C4
C6
C7,8
CI
Ship, pipeline
Pipeline
Mainly road
Pipeline, rail
LDPE, HDPE
Ethoxylates, glycols
Nitric Acid
Acetic Acid, methyl
acetate, acetocyanohydrin
VAM, methyl methacrylate,
PVOH
Ammonium
Sulphate
Ethyl Benzene Styrene EPS, SBR, ABS, SAN
Polybutadiene
VCM, HCL PVC, MDI,
hypochlorites
Plastics, bleaches,
polyurethanes
Propylene Oxide, ACN Polyols, propylene glycols
Polymers, Copolymers
Polyurethane
Butadiene-
Styrene,
Polyester resins, acrylic
dispersions
Polyols, poly glycols
Butadiene, MTBE,
succinic anhydride,
1-octene
Ethylene oxide, 
acetaldehyde, ethyl acetate
34
>
A
 P
A
R
A
D
IG
M
 S
H
IF
T
 :
 S
U
P
P
LY
 C
H
A
IN
 C
O
L
L
A
B
O
R
A
T
IO
N
A
N
D
 C
O
M
P
E
T
IT
IO
N
IN
A
N
D
 B
E
T
W
E
E
N
E
U
R
O
P
E
’S
 C
H
E
M
IC
A
L
 C
L
U
S
T
E
R
S
4. INTERVIEW RESULTS
A total of 26 executives from the 
ARRR cluster and 27 executives 
from the Tarragona cluster were 
interviewed by INSEAD researchers. 
Statistics obtained from the inter-
views were subsequently discussed 
in the respective ARRR and Tarragona 
Think Tanks, as well as in the Steering 
Committee. This section presents a 
summary of the results from this proc-
ess. It is organized around 6 questions 
concerning the ARRR and Tarragona 
cluster functioning:
What are the advantages of the clus-
ters?
What are the main disadvantages of 
operating in the clusters?
What are the obstacles hindering 
problem solving?
What are the opportunities for hori-
zontal cluster-driven collaboration?
What are the opportunities for vertical 
cluster-driven collaboration?
Who should lead the ARRR and Tar-
ragona clusters?
4.1 ARRR cluster
The statistics for the ARRR cluster 
together with the comments and in-
terpretations of the ARRR Think Tank 
are reported below.
4.1.1 Advantages of the ARRR 
cluster
For producers, the access to competitive 
raw materials and feedstocks, proxim-
ity of suppliers within the cluster area 
and existing infrastructure are the main 
reasons for being in the ARRR cluster 
(Figure 4-1). Proximity of suppliers and 
availability of feedstock account together 
for 44% of the responses stating input 
costs as being the main advantage of 
the chemical clusters. Manufacturers de-
velop close physical links with their sup-
pliers to maximize operational efficiency 
and shorten freight legs, as illustrated in 
the Rotterdam chlorine case (see below). 
Although accessibility to the hinterland 
customer base is vital, the proximity of 
customers is not perceived by chemi-
cal manufacturers as being a significant 
reason for locating in the cluster, while it 
is the main driver for LSPs who decide 
to locate close to their markets. This also 
indicates that outbound logistics was 
not considered as a limiting factor when 
manufacturers decided to locate in the 
clusters.
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Figure 4-1 ARRR - Benefits of chemical clusters (green/LSPs, blue/producers)
TERQUIMSA terminal, Port of Tarragona
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The benefits of co-siting: 
the Rotterdam chlorine case
Rotterdam is home to one of the most highly integrated and ef-
ficient chlorine and derivatives clusters in the world, built around 
the modern chlorine manufacturing operations of Akzo Nobel in 
the Botlek part of Rotterdam. Chlorine is supplied by a network of 
pipelines to a number of derivatives producers in the vicinity.
Shin-Etsu, a Japanese producer of vinyls, has a long-term contract 
with Akzo Nobel for the supply of chlorine to its ethylene dichloride 
(EDC), vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) 
manufacturing processes. The EDC and VCM plants are physically 
located on the Akzo Nobel site, while the PVC plant is a few kilom-
eters away in Pernis. The connection between VCM and PVC units 
is by pipeline, leasing one of the multicore pipelines for this stretch 
(see description of Multicore below).
Huntsman is another important member of the Rotterdam chlorine 
derivatives cluster, having a long-term chlorine supply contract 
with Akzo Nobel for its MDI manufacturing operations in the Ro-
zenburg area of Rotterdam. The chlorine that Huntsman uses is 
returned to Akzo Nobel in the form of gaseous hydrochloric acid, 
which is then used as an additional feedstock for the EDC/VCM 
production by Shin-Etsu. This recycling step allows the chlorine 
molecules to be used twice.
Hexion takes chlorine from Akzo Nobel for epichlorhydrin produc-
tion and uses it to manufacture a range of epoxy resins at its plant 
in Pernis. 
Tronox also plays a role in the Rotterdam chlorine derivatives clus-
ter. The company manufactures titanium dioxide at its Botlek plant 
and draws its chlorine needs from Akzo Nobel via a dedicated 
pipeline link. 
These 5 companies have established a highly integrated and syn-
ergistic collaborative model enabling optimal production efficien-
cies and economics to the benefit of all stakeholders, avoiding 
in addition the highly dangerous above-ground transportation of 
chlorine. A significant expansion of chlorine capacity has been 
necessary to support the growing demand among the derivative 
producers.
The discussion of the Think Tank 
around these results provided the 
occasion to review the history of the 
existing clusters with the participants. 
The group agreed that there is a virtu-
ous development cycle of a chemical 
cluster. Companies move to clusters 
as part of natural organic growth 
and self interest – not necessarily to 
consciously exploit the collabora-
tive opportunities and advantages of 
the cluster. First, manufacturers settle 
in a region for geographical reasons, 
looking for upstream supply synergies 
with other manufacturers. LSPs then 
settle in the cluster once a critical mass 
has been reached, ensuring service 
providers a satisfactory revenue stream 
mainly from storage warehousing, 
handling activities and transporta-
tion within the cluster, and servicing 
customers of their customers located 
outside the cluster. The critical mass 
also applies to the development of 
supporting infrastructure like internal 
cluster pipelines which can only be 
operated with a sufficient guaranteed 
throughput. We observe that LSPs 
and port authorities often team up to 
provide attractive infrastructure for 
manufacturers, reinforcing the cluster 
dynamics. The MultiCore pipeline in 
Rotterdam is a very good illustration 
of this situation. It seems that similar 
actions initiated by producers are rare.
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Terminal, Tarragona, VOPAK
Pipe rack connection, 
Marl Chemical Park, ChemSite
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CLUSTER
MultiCore pipeline in the port of Rotterdam: 
a common infrastructure to the benefit of all
The effective and efficient operation of the Rotterdam chemical 
cluster depends on the availability of adequate infrastructure.  For 
many years the Port of Rotterdam Authority has played an active 
role in supporting the creation of optimum conditions for par-
ticipants in the cluster. Pipelines play a key role in the cluster in 
moving large volumes of liquids and gases in a safe, environmen-
tally friendly, and cost efficient manner between producers and 
users. Working in a Joint Venture with VOPAK, the Port of Rot-
terdam Authority has created Multicore, a unique concept for the 
renting of pipeline capacity (on a variable time and distance basis) 
for companies in the port and industrial area. This offers an attrac-
tive, cost effective alternative to truck transport or inland vessels 
and barges.
The 20 kilometer long Multicore pipeline bundle (four pipelines 
with different diameters and constructed of different materials) 
runs from east to west, straight through the port and industrial 
area. Further expansion west (between Europoort and Maasvlakte 
over a distance of 17 kilometers) is in preparation. Oil products, as 
well as chemicals and gases, can be transported via the MultiCore 
pipeline bundle.
Figure 4-2 MultiCore pipeline concept in the port of Rotterdam
The competition of LSPs benefits the 
existing base of chemical producers 
and signals the attractiveness of the 
cluster to potential new entrants. This 
positive feedback loop might weaken if 
the cluster becomes a victim of its own 
success and starts struggling with bot-
tleneck issues.
Unlike the Silicon Valley cluster, inter-
viewees did not view the availability 
of skilled workforce and marketing 
capabilities in Antwerp, Rotterdam and 
in the Rhine/Ruhr area as a significant 
advantage compared to the geographi-
cal and infrastructure advantages. 
Nevertheless, the Think Tank dis-
cussions pointed out that a skilled 
workforce is needed today and also 
increasingly in the future.
4.1.2 Disadvantages of the ARRR 
cluster
As a consequence of the development 
of the Antwerp and Rotterdam clusters, 
the tonnage leaving both clusters has 
grown significantly over the last 
15 years (for instance the container 
traffic in Antwerp increased from 
16.5 million tons in 1990 to 80.8 million 
tons in 2006). Unfortunately, chemical 
producers from Antwerp and Rot-
terdam share their road infrastructure 
with private users and other indus-
tries, thereby creating a bottleneck 
that the public authorities will have 
difficulties solving in the short term.
Manufacturers, LSPs and port 
authorities need to team up and use 
the Antwerp and Rotterdam cluster
15%
13%
13%
17%
43%
5%
21%
30%
44%
Lack of infrastructures
Lack of investments
Land unavailability
High competition
Traffic congestion
Figure 4-3 ARRR - cluster disadvantages 
(green/LSPs, blue/producers)
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synergies on hinterland deliveries to 
make environmentally friendly trans-
port modes a competitive alternative 
to road transport. Indeed, more than 
70% of the responses mention conges-
tion stems from the lack of investment 
in infrastructure in the Antwerp/Rot-
terdam cluster. The extension of the 
Port of Rotterdam with the scheduled 
Maasvlakte 2 (see Figure 3-6) might 
aggravate the problem if producers are 
not willing or able to increase the rail 
and barge portion of their shipments in 
the near future.
Apart from traffic congestion, manufac-
turers do not consider land availability 
or competition as being significant 
hurdles for operating in the clusters. 
Competition is considered by the 
interviewees as being worldwide and 
not simply limited to the ARRR cluster. 
Furthermore, the existence of swap 
arrangements and common capacity 
investments such as the HPPO plant 
in Antwerp show that, subject to the 
respect of competition rules, manufac-
turers have no problem collaborating 
when the synergies are obvious and the 
value proposition is economically and 
strategically sound.
Apart from traffic congestion, LSPs
perceive competition between them-
selves as a disadvantage of the clus-
ter. This, as mentioned earlier, is the 
logical consequence of a successful 
cluster development that has attract-
ed many service providers to the 
region. However, one LSP mentioned 
that the size of the market was big 
enough to allow many LSPs to build 
sufficient critical mass to work profit-
ably, thus not requiring LSPs to merge 
their assets. As a result of this frag-
mentation of the market, companies 
may have to load and/or discharge 
parcels from different storage points 
in the port. This extends the waiting 
time for the vessels, increases demur-
rage costs and harms asset produc-
tivity. To tackle the asset fragmenta-
tion issue, Oiltanking and Stolthaven 
Terminals, two logistics providers, 
have teamed up to develop dedicated 
storage facilities, thereby reducing inef-
ficiencies in vessel loading.
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Asset pooling between LSPs in the Antwerp 
cluster: the Oiltanking/Stolthaven collaboration
In March 2006, Oiltanking GmbH and Stolthaven Terminals BV
announced an Antwerp terminal joint venture called Oiltanking
Stolthaven Antwerp NV, which will operate as an independent 
liquid storage provider on the right bank of the river Schelde.
The terminal is located in the midst of the Antwerp chemical clus-
ter and is part of the extensive logistics infrastructure supporting 
cluster operations. The terminal will be developed as a “Specialty 
Chemical Hub” for the Antwerp and Rotterdam (plus Amsterdam) 
clusters, and as a transportation hub to improve the turnaround 
and utilization of the Stolt chemical parcel tanker fleet.
Parcel tanker operators can face up to 40% of total vessel time 
in port, moving from one jetty to another. The downside of the 
cluster may be that there are too many producers and LSPs who 
have the critical mass to build their own assets, rather than being 
forced by their small size to explore all the opportunities to share 
logistics assets inside the cluster.
The LBC/Ertisa collaboration is another illustration of a logistics pro-
vider (LBC) collaborating and setting up dedicated storage assets 
on a customer’s site (Bayer) to serve another customer (Ertisa).
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Benefit from cluster synergies via vertical 
collaboration: the LBC/Ertisa case
In July 2006 the LBC tank terminal group and Ertisa, a subsidiary 
of the Spanish oil and energy group CEPSA announced their 
intention to form a Joint Venture to build and operate a tank stor-
age terminal in Antwerp. The first phase of the project would be to 
build storage for Ertisa products – followed by a second phase for 
other LBC customers. There would also be facilities for the han-
dling of rail tank cars, road tank trucks, and tank containers. Other
value added services, such as drumming and blending, would be 
built in line with demand.
The terminal will be located at the Bayer site on the right bank 
of the Schelde river, in the heart of the chemical cluster. The site 
offers deepwater access to accommodate the largest chemical 
parcel and product tankers.
The demand for storage was based on Ertisa’s increasing pro-
duction of phenol and acetone in Huelva in the south of Spain, 
and the need to position product close to its major customers in 
Northern Europe. This complemented LBC’s plans to strengthen 
their position in the growing Antwerp chemical cluster, extend 
their relationship with an established customer, and provide 
existing and new customers with a prime new location for stor-
age and other services.
This development is also in line with Bayer’s plans to develop the 
spare land on their site as a chemical park, and with the process 
of optimizing the use of services and infrastructure available on 
the site. This is a good example of cluster-driven collaboration.
4.1.3 Obstacles to overcoming 
cluster disadvantages
According to shippers, the main ob-
stacle to solving congestion issues is 
the low willingness of the stakehold-
ers to tackle this issue in a collabo-
rative fashion (55% of the answers, 
Figure 4-4). Since manufacturers have 
outsourced their logistics activities, 
they do not see themselves taking the 
lead in developing logistics solutions 
on a local scale. This point of view is 
reinforced by the fact that the deci-
sion centers for potential investments 
are often not located in the cluster, 
which leads to such projects receiving 
lower attention on the radar screen of 
a producer’s top management (22% of 
the answers).
The answers of LSPs are more 
balanced, but point out two issues in 
the current cluster setup. The first 
is linked to the competition intensity 
between LSPs, which is fueled by the 
producers’ practice of breaking down 
their logistics activities into smaller 
pieces and granting short term con-
tracts to a set of competing LSPs, 
rather than exploiting a “total cost to 
serve” solution. According to a service 
provider participating in the Think 
Tank, the fragmentation of the logistics 
market is the consequence of the lack 
of willingness of producers to collabo-
rate with LSPs. Nevertheless, the Think 
Tank discussions also highlighted the 
fact that LSPs collaborate voluntarily 
when their service scope is comple-
mentary (e.g., the Pernis Combi Termi-
nal in Rotterdam) or when a producer 
asks competing service providers to 
develop a solution together.
Figure 4-4 ARRR - obstacles to overcoming cluster disadvantage 
(green/LSPs, blue/producers)
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Fragmentation of the market
Absence of companies' local decision centres
Lack of port authorities', governmental and regional actions
Lack of collaboration between the companies
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Horizontal LSP collaboration in the Port of Rot-
terdam - Pernis Combi Terminal
Pernis Combi Terminal in the heart of the industrial port area of 
Rotterdam was created in 2005 on the initiative of Den Hartogh
Logistics, Nijhof-Wassink, MCS (Multi-Modal Container Ship-
ping) and VLS. The project started in 2003 when the LSPs agreed 
that there was market potential for a Tri-modal service centre in 
the Rotterdam industrial area, combining road, rail and water. 
This terminal could be further complemented with warehousing, 
drumming lines and container storage. The terminal started its 
operations in February 2006.
Each of the four collaborators has its own specialty to bring to 
the venture: Den Hartogh Logistics is a bulk liquid chemical logis-
tics specialist, Nijhof-Wassink a bulk specialist, MCS a shipping 
specialist and VLS a warehouse specialist.
This LSP collaboration offers the Rotterdam chemical cluster an 
efficient hub and spoke tri-modal solution. Truck, barge and rail 
combine Sea Port and European Maritime cargo with the Europe-
an rail and road network, offering the possibility of consolidating 
Continental and Maritime cargo for distribution into Europe or 
transshipment to overseas destinations by truck, rail or barge. 
The drumming and warehouse operations further complement 
these services.
The current train services have been operating directly to Györ
(Hungary) since February 2006 and to Lyon (France) since June 
2007, and there is a daily shunt to the main Rotterdam station 
for outbound services to other destinations. The current barge 
services offer shuttles to and from the other European chemical 
clusters.
The second issue is linked to the frag-
mentation of the market which leads 
to the inability of LSPs to obtain a 
complete picture of the cluster flows.
While fragmentation ensures intense 
competition between logistics service 
providers, the latter lack the critical 
size and planning stability to optimize 
their logistics infrastructure. In fact, 
in the current setup, the Think Tank 
members were skeptical about wheth-
er this fragmentation really benefits 
producers in the long run. Producers 
establish their logistics network by 
tapping into the independent networks 
of several logistics service providers. 
Taking into account the fact that chemi-
cal customers follow multiple sourcing 
strategies, shipments might arrive from 
different independent channels. The 
resulting demand variability affects the 
operating efficiency of LSPs, who need 
to adapt their capacities ad-hoc at high 
costs.
A solution could be to develop pan-
European networks, but the competi-
tion intensity may hamper the deve-
lopment of joint operations of shared 
assets between LSPs.
4.1.4 Opportunities for horizontal 
cluster collaboration
Both producers and LSPs agree on 
the opportunities offered by horizontal 
cluster collaboration, i.e., cooperation 
with competitors in order to capture the 
synergy effects offered by the cluster 
(Figure 4-5). Each opportunity and its 
limits will be addressed in the follow-
ing.
Pooling of logistics resources 
between service providers could 
increase the efficiency of the current 
assets and improve the competitive-
ness of the cluster as a whole.
Figure 4-5 ARRR - opportunities for horizontal cluster collaboration 
(green/LSPs, blue/shippers)
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Collaboratively enhancing supply chain skills
Swap arrangements
Sharing of info for planning purposes
Developing logistics infrastructures
Pooling of logistics resources
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Pooling of logistics assets
Interestingly, the pooling of logistics 
resources is the most frequent answer 
for both producers and service provi-
ders (35% of the answers). According 
to the LSPs, the growth of the cluster 
has allowed them to build their own lo-
gistics capabilities separately. In some 
cases, however, this uncoordinated 
growth has led to inefficiencies within 
the cluster. The horizontal collaboration 
of Oiltanking and Stolthaven Terminals 
is an example of LSPs consolidating 
assets in order to correct inefficiencies 
related to jetty fragmentation. 
As mentioned previously, producers 
follow a contradictory strategy with 
respect to the cluster opportunities. 
Producers expect LSPs to be able to 
collaborate in order to optimize the use 
of their assets. Simultaneously, they 
fuel the competition between LSPs
by frequently tendering their logistic 
processes while not giving guarantees 
on quantities. The fact that service 
providers have currently a very partial 
and temporary view of the overall 
cluster flows prevents them to design 
long-term, sustainable concepts for 
supplying the hinterland. In a nutshell, 
manufacturers forego cluster-inherent 
synergies with respect to their out-
bound logistics by fragmenting the 
market and not sharing logistics assets 
with their competitors.
In the presence of a dynamic but 
fragmented market for LSPs, shippers
are the main players able to trigger 
the development of solutions exploit-
ing cluster synergies in distribution 
logistics. In this context, one promising 
opportunity is the ComLog initiative of 
Bayer, Degussa and Lanxess.
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Figure 4-6 Isolated tendering cannot take 
advantage of cluster opportunities
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ComLog – Common Logistics Procurement: 
an example of both vertical and horizontal 
cooperation
Besides integrating service providers more closely into producer 
supply chains (vertical cooperation), the cooperation between 
producers themselves (horizontal cooperation) presents poten-
tial for synergies (e.g., by using a common portfolio of service 
providers, optimizing logistics concepts, and achieving operat-
ing efficiencies for all parties involved). When all the parties are 
located within a cluster the concepts can be more easily devel-
oped and the opportunities and benefits more readily achieved.
Based in the ChemSite cluster, Bayer and Degussa imple-
mented an innovative form of horizontal cooperation when 
they set up a common logistics procurement operation in 2003 
called ComLog. Today the partners are Bayer, Lanxess and 
Degussa – the latter being represented within the RAG Group by 
RAG Service GmbH, under which the procurement function has 
since been centralized.
Operating within a cluster environment leverages the benefits of 
bundling of demand for logistics services from three manufac-
turers. As a result LSPs are able to operate on a more efficient 
scale.
One example that horizontal collaboration can foster vertical 
collaboration is the strategic partnership between ComLog and 
the German Railway company Railion. Next to a long term frame 
contract minimizing operating costs for inland transportation 
and providing incentives to shift more cargo from road to rail, the 
contracted volumes allowed the implementation of a ComLog
specific single railcar solution.
Infrastructures
opportunities
Consensus also exists about the fact 
that the development of industry-
wide infrastructure would contribute 
to relaxing the transport bottleneck. 
From the interviews, the most cited 
opportunities have been pipelines and 
multimodal hubs that will be discussed 
in the following.
For feedstock and commodities in a 
liquid or gaseous phase, pipelines 
appear to be the most effective alterna-
tive to road transport, reducing risks 
inherent to the transport of dangerous 
goods as well as carbon emissions. 
As the interviews revealed, potential 
for improvement through pipelines 
within clusters is limited since already 
more than 90% of the commodities 
are forwarded through them. However, 
opportunities to link several clusters re-
main (especially for propylene supply). 
The main benefits are expected further 
downstream (intermediates and final 
products) where the shipment quanti-
ties are much smaller (full truckload or 
less than truckload) and thus shipped 
directly by truck rather than via multi-
modal platforms. Multimodal platforms 
are perceived as a means to reduce 
the road congestion by merging ship-
ments from different sources, but they 
require all LSPs to use the same hubs 
in order to guarantee sufficient loads. 
Thus, shipments could leave the main 
production centers via rail or water and 
be dispatched in smaller loads by road 
from spokes in the hinterland.
Although clusters might provide the 
critical mass to make capital-inten-
sive investments such as pipelines or 
multimodal hubs profitable, horizon-
tal collaboration between chemical 
manufacturers is not automatically 
emerging for various reasons. First,
there is the need to act in conformity 
with competition rules. Sharing quanti-
ties and destination information be-
tween manufacturers is highly sensitive 
from a legal standpoint. Second, manu-
facturers might not be willing to share 
assets with their competitors if they 
feel no need to do so because of their 
perceived superiority in the market, or 
if they feel this will effectively elimi-
nate a competitive edge, or barrier to 
entry. Thirdly, different manufacturers 
follow different strategic objectives, 
making industry-wide investments 
difficult, although the cluster itself and 
other stakeholders would benefit as a 
whole. The failed EPDC pipeline project 
provides a good example to illustrate 
the dynamics in practice and their 
consequence.
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The challenge of multi-company infrastruc-
ture investments: the EPDC case
A project to construct a polymer grade propylene pipeline link-
ing several production and consumption sites in northwest Eu-
rope had been considered by some companies in the European 
petrochemical industry for many years. The example of the ARG
ethylene line illustrated that this type of line could be a success-
ful way of moving propylene around the industry, with the clear 
environmental benefits of using pipelines to transport this gas 
while preserving potentially beneficial economics.
By 1999 the industry believed that a substantial European short-
fall of polymer grade propylene to supply derivatives was likely 
to come about in the following years, requiring increased imports 
from other regions of the world. Consequently, more companies 
became interested in a pipeline linking European polypropylene 
manufacturers to the sea and access to polypropylene imports. It 
was at this time that the EPDC (European Pipeline Development
Corp) was created in order to construct the so-called ‘U-line’
linking Rotterdam/Antwerp with Marl in the North and Wesseling
in the South.
EPDC originally comprised 15 industry shareholder companies; by 
2005 these had been reduced to 8 as a result of industry consoli-
dation. These 8 companies (INEOS, Westgas, Shell, Sabic, Cela-
nese, DSM, Sasol and BASF) had interests in, and economic ben-
efits from, different parts of the line. All agreed that, once the whole 
line was constructed, the entire petrochemical industry in Western 
Europe would benefit in unforeseen ways from its completion.
On the surface, this seems like a real example of industry cooper-
ation leading to improved infrastructure linkage between clusters 
in Western Europe. However the decision was taken in March 
2007 to terminate the full project, although a build of reduced 
scope, in northern Germany only, may still go ahead.
According to industry experts, the failure of this apparently ben-
eficial horizontal collaboration has several origins. Firstly, the 
‘lowest cost’ objective of the project introduced elements (i.e., a 
drive for subsidies) which extended the project and, in fact, add-
ed cost. To achieve the maximum in subsidies, at least two years 
was added to the project timeline. Furthermore, the conditions 
imposed by the authorities to obtain these subsidies resulted in 
higher costs and restricted flexibility in attracting new investors. 
As a result costs were 35% higher as a direct consequence of the 
subsidy conditions – far outweighing the value of the subsidy!
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A second reason is that the single project cross-border execution 
strategy was not in line with existing pipeline construction market 
realities, as there were no cross-border pipeline and engineering 
companies. A tailored approach by country had to be adopted 
which, with hindsight, added complexity and cost.
Thirdly, the business model, which had many shareholder 
‘givens’ or conditions, hindered the project roll-out. The share-
holder companies were driven by their ‘internal economics’: 
“What’s in it for me?” - and not in the first place by an overall 
general industry or stakeholder value. This had several conse-
quences, but, put simply, each decision taken by EPDC had to 
be tested against individual company self interest. This length-
ened both the process and the overall project time and cost. The 
shareholder ‘givens’ thus restricted the EPDC ability to optimally 
manage the overall project.
Hence the project took too long from inception to decision, 
leading to increasing costs, particularly in the last two years, as 
global shortages of raw materials and EPDC contractor capac-
ity impacted all projects. Of course, as costs rose, profitability 
declined – which led to a unanimous view in March 2007 that the 
project was not viable.
>
Sharing of planning infor-
mation to exploit cluster 
synergies
Despite the ComLog example, sharing 
of transport planning information be-
tween chemical manufacturers is very 
critically perceived, especially because 
of concerns related to competition 
rules. Moreover, the joint design of a 
logistics network could lead to the 
exchange of strategic information 
related to the long-term sales plans of 
competing manufacturers. For these 
reasons, producers consider that 
LSPs should share planning data in 
order to exploit the synergies of joint 
shipments.
Swap arrangements
Although the manufacturers have cited 
swap arrangements as examples of 
horizontal collaboration in 13% of the 
cases, we observe that the occurrence
of this answer depends on the posi-
tion of the company in the chemical 
chain and on its competitive strategy.
All interviewees are concerned about 
compliance with competition rules and 
companies referring to swaps do this 
after due examination of competition 
law effects. Swaps seem to be more 
common practice for raw materials 
and feedstock, whereas polyethylene 
and polypropylene producers are less 
willing to collaborate in swap arrange-
ments within a local area. 
Apart from the increasing number of 
product variants making a direct swap 
cumbersome to organize (see Figure 
4- 7), polymer commodities manufac-
turers are reluctant to allow their cus-
tomers to receive competing products. 
To cite one interviewee: “you do not 
want to remind your customer that your 
competitor can also deliver the same 
item”. Swap agreements thus seem 
to be triggered by the willingness to 
avoid empty transport legs. In this 
context, the most significant savings 
are achieved through swaps between 
two different clusters. Isolated chemi-
cal clusters separated from each 
other seem more interested in swaps 
than integrated ones. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that the potential 
of swap arrangements is cited more 
frequently in Tarragona than in the 
Antwerp/Rotterdam region.
Figure 4-7 Scope of profitable swaps
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Development of workforce 
competencies
Finally, companies do not grant the 
same importance to the joint develop-
ment of workforce competencies as 
they do to infrastructure topics. Supply
chain skills are not seen as a priority, 
although the interviewees fear an 
imminent shortage of skilled work-
ers when the baby-boom generation 
retires. 
4.1.5 Opportunities for vertical 
cluster collaboration
Customer/supplier relationships offer 
opportunities to obtain the benefits of 
clustered operations. From the Think 
Tank discussions in 2004 and 2005, it 
was obvious that lack of information 
sharing made it difficult for manu-
facturers and LSPs to obtain a clear 
picture of structural network oppor-
tunities and benefits from operational 
planning. The integration of service 
providers in the strategic network 
planning process of shippers is the 
most frequently quoted opportunity in 
our interviews (48% for LSPs, 33% for 
producers - Figure 4-8). This inte-
grated planning has started with some 
shippers but remains limited to a very 
small set of logistics service providers. 
Concerning inbound and outbound 
logistics, we recall that this integration 
might only pay off in the cluster con-
cept if the service provider has already 
reached a critical mass in the cluster.
To benefit from cluster synergies, LSPs
need to have access to the best plan-
ning information available so they can 
efficiently plan their loads and optimize 
the use of their assets. Thus, service 
providers perceive a collaborative 
sharing of data as the main opportunity 
(35% of answers), while this is not re-
flected in the producers’ answers. From 
the interviews, we know that automat-
ed forecast exchanges between LSPs 
and producers (via electronic data in-
terchange for instance) are very rare, 
and this potentially results in higher 
transaction costs to the service 
providers. Forecasts are generally 
exchanged on a monthly aggregated 
basis via spreadsheet applications. 
Forecast data with higher granularity is 
either not available due to planning 
uncertainty or  too costly to exchange 
via automated IT bridges. The CLA
initiative between BP Chemicals and 
major logistics players, organized 
within the scope of one single legal 
entity located on the BP site in order to 
enable access to the best information 
available, is an exception to the rule.
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Figure 4-8 ARRR - opportunities for vertical cluster collaboration 
(green/LSPs, blue/producers)
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Joint consortium in the cluster: 
the CLA initiative
BP Chemicals decided in 1999 to tender all the liquid volumes 
out of their Benelux storage and production facilities, seeking a 
Pan-European solution for the transportation of their total volume. 
In 1999, the whole package was divided between 12 transport 
companies, who all had their niche market strengths.
To enter the tendering process, 4 companies decided to establish 
a legal entity with the sole purpose of delivering a one-stop-shop 
service to BP Chemicals for the complete Benelux liquid package. 
The legal entity was headed by the following companies: Bertschi 
AG, Dedijcker NV, Dedecker-Vanriet NV, and VanderLee Transport 
This ‘natural’ alliance between 4 LSPs was enabled by the follow-
ing factors:
They had trust and respect for each other with a similar back-
ground (family owned, own fleet and drivers, high quality stand-
ards).
Each company had its own geographical strength and they were 
therefore complementary partners with subsidiaries spread 
throughout the ARRR-cluster.
When, in mid 2005, Dedijcker NV stopped its activities in the haul-
age industry, the three remaining partners managed to absorb its 
volume without hampering the day-to-day operations. 
The success of the Alliance was dependent on a single contract, 
joint investment in equipment, and a CLA implant in the BP Chem-
icals office. BP enjoyed the advantage of dealing with one part-
ner, both commercially and operationally, and having joint project 
teams to work on continuous improvement in the supply chain.
This is an example of cluster driven collaboration with natural 
alignment, resulting from cluster proximity, rather than being 
enforced. According to the interviewees, success was heavily 
dependent on mutual trust and an openness to share information 
and costs.  
Chemical manufacturers face similar in-
formation quality issues with their cus-
tomers and identify vendor-managed 
inventory (VMI) solutions more than 
customer-managed inventory (CMI) 
as an opportunity to improve supply 
chain transparency. Currently, suppli-
ers of chemicals face erratic demand 
patterns from their customers and do 
not have the opportunity to be proac-
tive because of the lack of information 
shared. Without reliable forecast data, 
shippers are not able to optimize their 
shipments to use the synergies of-
fered by clustered customers.
The last main opportunity related to 
vertical cluster collaboration is the 
development of more efficient ways 
to dispatch products outside the 
cluster. Producers agree on the fact 
that increased bulk shipments would 
improve the load of the trucks, but in 
the interviews they also mentioned 
repeatedly the limits of this approach.
First, customers might not want to 
invest in bulk storage capacities. When
it comes to commodities and certainly 
to specialty chemicals, the quantities 
to be delivered can be too small to 
justify bulk shipment, or the material 
may not be suited for this purpose 
(e.g. PVC rolls). Although an increase 
in bulk transport is attractive from an 
environmental perspective, marketing 
aspects constrain the expansion of 
bulk transportation further down the 
chemical chain.
The shift from road to rail and water-
based freight was seen as an oppor-
tunity by both LSPs and producers 
in about 20% of the cases. However, 
the interviews highlighted the lack of 
reliability of these transport modes 
compared to road, as well as the 
costs of accessibility. Similar to the 
Rotterdam MultiCore case, a coordi-
nated approach between producers, 
port authorities and LSPs appears to 
be necessary, given the significant 
investments required.  
4.1.6  Who should lead the develop-
ment of the cluster?
The earlier discussions highlighted 
the need for coordination between 
stakeholders (producers, LSPs, 
authorities) to identify and exploit the 
opportunities offered by chemical 
clusters. This opinion is shared by all 
interviewees; none of them answered 
positively to “we don’t need coordina-
tion” (Figure 4- 9). 
The question however remains who 
should take the lead in the identifica-
tion and exploitation of the opportu-
nities. The interview results are very 
revealing in the sense that LSPs state
in the majority of cases (65%) one focal 
organization is required to take the 
lead, but there was no agreement on 
who that should be. The manufactur-
ers’ answers are more precise and sug-
gest industry associations and manu-
facturers in general take the lead in
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identifying opportunities within the 
cluster and triggering investments.
The Think Tank provided the opportu-
nity to debate on what a coordinating 
body should look like and what actions 
it should be empowered to undertake. 
With respect to the land ownership 
structures in the European clusters 
(apart from ChemSite), “directive” 
coordination bodies seemed impos-
sible. Port Authorities in Antwerp and
Rotterdam or cluster associations like 
ChemSite are recognized as having a 
global view of their respective cluster 
and are therefore partners of choice 
when it comes to getting a bird’s-eye 
view of their network.
Indeed, cluster leadership does not 
mean that a company dictates its rules 
to others. Chemical clusters need 
participants which are prepared to 
take the lead on initiatives, in most of 
the cases driven by self-interest (like 
the INEOS Ethylene Oxide case), but 
paving the way for other manufactur-
ers and stakeholders by proving the 
viability of cluster-driven concepts.
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Figure 4-9 ARRR - cluster development leadership 
(green/LSPs, blue/producers)
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CLUSTER
Proactive site leadership: 
the INEOS Ethylene Oxide case
INEOS Oxide has a long history in Antwerp through a series of suc-
cessive ownerships. In turn it has been Union Carbide, BP Chemi-
cals and Inspec at the Zwijndrecht site on the left bank of the River 
Schelde. Third party hosting at the 200 ha site has been in place 
for many years, since BP Chemicals’ decision to sell its LDPE as-
sets to Neste and its hydroethoxylates facilities to Union Carbide.
With spare land available, and a strong interest on the part of IN-
EOS to find additional on-site users for ethylene oxide, a highly 
hazardous product unsuitable for transportation, the site has been 
heavily promoted to attract investors; especially companies look-
ing to establish an operational foothold in Europe.
Kuraray, the first Japanese chemical company to settle in the Ant-
werp port area, built an ethylene vinyl alcohol (EVOH) copolymer 
resin plant in 1999, and has subsequently progressively increased 
capacity.
Nippon Shokubai followed Kuraray two years later and built a 
super-absorbent polymers plant on a plot adjacent to the INEOS 
site. As a result  eight parties are now on the site including General 
Electric, Dow, Praxair, Seppic, Specialty Polymers Antwerp, and 
Borealis.
Figure 4-10 INEOS Oxide co-siting concept
The site offers many cluster advantages to new investors: land 
for production facilities; shared infrastructure; feedstock supply 
on site as well as by pipeline; utilities; waste treatment; and lo-
gistics facilities, including a jetty, a railhead, loading gantries and 
tank storage. Due to this proactive site management, the ethylene 
oxide capacity has more than tripled in the last 15 years.
INEOS
Kuraray
Dow
Seppic
Spec. Polymers
Antw.
Borealis
GE plastics
oxygen, nitrogen
INEOS site
Utilities, wastewater treatment, maintenance, process control
et
hy
le
ne
 o
xi
de
Praxair INEOS / Essent Energy
power
Nippon
Shokubai
?????
4.2 Tarragona
The statistics for the Tarragona cluster 
together with the comments and inter-
pretations of the Tarragona Think Tank 
are reported below.
4.2.1 Advantages of the Tarragona 
cluster
The main advantages perceived by the 
Tarragona producers are the availability 
of competitive feedstock and raw ma-
terials, and the proximity of suppliers. 
With an import of almost 
18 million tons of petroleum products, 
the port represents the main source 
of the necessary inputs for the manu-
facturing processes of the chemical 
companies settled in Tarragona. The 
appropriate flow of chemicals from the 
port to the refineries, the crackers and 
the storage locations is ensured by a 
suitable infrastructure.
The Dixquimics pipelines rack, which 
involved both a high percentage of 
companies and the local authorities, 
emphasizes the importance of infra-
structure in the Tarragona cluster op-
erations. It also points to the necessity 
of considering the longer term mainte-
nance and growth of the cluster’s and 
regional infrastructure.
Figure 4-11 Tarragona - Benefits of chemical cluster 
(green/LSPs, blue/producers)
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TAPP AIE - oil products terminal, 
Port of Tarragona, BASF and Dow
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CLUSTER
Dixquimics Pipe Rack
Dixquimics represents the rack of over 60 pipelines connecting 
the port with the south industrial park in the Tarragona chemi-
cal cluster. Several companies use the same pipeline complex 
for their product interchanges. We can report as an example the 
case of ethylene oxide, flowing from IQA to Dow Quimica and 
Clariant, and the case of chlorine, flowing from Ercros to Bayer.
Started in 1998 with the participation of just 5 chemical com-
panies, Dixquimics now involves 16 companies in the Tarragona 
industrial complex, and moves 1.5 million tons/year of chemicals 
along a route of about 7 km.
The prospect of significantly decreasing investment costs and 
unifying all the pipelines into one single legal entity, in order to 
obtain a simplified authorization process, led the chemical com-
panies to collaborate to embark on this project.
Since its construction, Dixquimics has favored the development 
of logistics synergies between cluster players. In this respect, the 
example of Terminales Quimicos S.A. (Terquimsa) handling vinyl 
acetate for Celanese at its port facilities, constitutes an impor-
tant example. Indeed, due to the Dixquimics rack of pipelines, 
the previous vinyl acetate road transportation has been com-
pletely eliminated and product handling has been completely 
outsourced to Terquimsa.
The availability of infrastructure rep-
resents a key advantage for the LSPs
in the Tarragona cluster. However, the 
main reason that they were attracted to 
the cluster is the high concentration of 
chemical companies, and therefore of 
customers. This observation is consist-
ent with the progressive specialization 
of the producers in the manufacturing 
of chemicals, and their subsequent 
outsourcing of industry-related serv-
ices. The presence of the LSPs started 
20 years ago. The integration of the 
LSPs with the producers is gradually 
progressing, but examples of LSPs
co-siting on the land of the chemical 
producers and engaged in storing, han-
dling and transporting chemicals  on a 
long term basis, are not common yet.
The recruitment of well-qualified 
logistics and supply chain specialists 
is reported as being quite difficult for 
both chemical companies and LSPs.
This could explain why the availability 
of skilled workforce is not perceived as 
a main advantage of the cluster. The 
promotion of training courses in logis-
tics and supply chain management is 
unanimously welcomed by the compa-
nies in the cluster.
4.2.2 Disadvantages of the Tarra-
gona cluster
The main disadvantage reported by 
the producers in the cluster is the 
lack of land availability. The chemical 
companies claim that, as the tourism 
industry has developed in the region, 
there has been less attention paid to 
the chemical industry by the local and 
regional government. The fact that no 
additional land has been earmarked 
for future chemical industry zoning 
has become a serious concern for 
both the producers and the LSPs,
since land availability plays a pivotal 
role in the longer term development of 
the cluster in Tarragona.
60 Figure 4-12 Tarragona - cluster disadvantages 
(green/LSPs, blue/producers)
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Land for future growth of the chemi-
cal industry in Tarragona is available 
almost uniquely within the properties 
of the chemical companies. Indeed the 
chemical facilities do not fully occupy 
the land of many chemical companies, 
and a substantial part (about 50%) 
remains unexploited. The Think Tank 
in Tarragona agreed on the necessity 
to analyze the feasibility of managing 
existing unexploited land on a joint/
collaborative basis which could en-
able long term land leases or sales of 
land to third party investments. The 
association of chemical companies 
in Tarragona, AEQT, is not vested 
with the power of managing the land, 
but the possibility of broadening and 
strengthening its role has been the 
subject of several discussions in the 
Think Tank sessions.
However, the chemical companies 
claim that the substantial percentage 
of unexploited land in the Tarragona 
cluster is also related to the complex-
ity of getting the right authorizations 
for the development of chemical 
projects on available/zoned land.
Finally, although showing a lower 
percentage result, the LSPs are also 
seriously concerned about the issue of 
land availability, since land prices in the 
chemical industrial parks in and around 
Tarragona have significantly increased 
over the last few years.
According to LSPs, the main disad-
vantage of being associated with the 
cluster is the high level of competi-
tion. This may explain the rare cases of 
horizontal collaboration between LSPs
in the cluster. Pooling logistics resourc-
es and joint development of logistics 
infrastructures are not considered as 
real opportunities by the LSPs. A high 
percentage of LSPs consider that 
the trigger for collaboration between 
them should come from the chemical 
producers.
Producers and LSPs partly agree that 
traffic congestion is a disadvantage of 
the cluster. The traffic congestion is-
sues do not relate to movements within 
the cluster, but rather to linking Tar-
ragona to its hinterland markets. The 
distance from neighboring European 
countries, the specific Spanish rail 
gauge different from the French one, 
and national constraints in road trans-
port (e.g. driving bans) are reported 
by the companies in Tarragona as the 
main complications in the distribution 
of the products from the manufacturers 
to the customers.
The prospect of increasing logistics 
efficiency triggered for example a 
collaboration initiative between Bayer
Polimeros, S.L. and Bertschi Iberica, 
S.L., with the objective of develop-
ing a container terminal based on the 
existing railway connection on Bayer’s 
property.
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CLUSTER
Multimodal Container Terminal
The Tarragona chemical cluster does not have a container rail 
terminal. Containers to and from the Tarragona manufacturing 
sites have to be moved by truck to Constantí, where the nearest 
terminal is located.  In 2005 the opportunity of constructing a 
container terminal for the whole Tarragona chemical cluster led 
Bertschi to start negotiating with Bayer, which had ample land 
available, and on whose property a railway connection was al-
ready present. After signing the land lease contract with Bayer
at the beginning of 2007, Bertschi is expected to complete the 
project by the fourth quarter of 2008.
The new set-up on the Bayer site will serve the whole Tarragona 
chemical cluster, with the following advantages:
UÊ À>`Ê ÌÀ>Ã«ÀÌÊ ÌÊ >`Ê vÀÊ ÌiÊ VÕÃÌiÀÊ vÊ />ÀÀ>}>Ê ÃÊ iÝ-
pected to significantly decrease, due to the proximity, easy 
access and flexibility of the rail terminal. This in turn would 
positively impact the carbon footprint;
UÊ `ÃÌÀLÕÌÊVÃÌÃÊ>ÀiÊiÝ«iVÌi`ÊÌÊ`iVÀi>Ãi]Ê`ÕiÊÌÊÌiÊ`ÀiVÌÊ
transshipment to rail within the cluster;
UÊ >ÊiÜÊVÌ>iÀÊÃÌÀ>}iÊV>«>LÌÞÊÜÌÊ ÌiÊVÕÃÌiÀÊÜÕ`Ê
mean that supply chain and production optimizations are 
possible.
The project of developing the multimodal terminal on the Bayer
property will benefit several other chemical producers in the 
cluster of Tarragona, such as Dow, Lanxess, INEOS, BASF, Rep-
sol, Aiscondel, Basell and Clariant. The vertical collaboration 
between Bertschi, Bayer and the other producers in the logis-
tics infrastructure on the Tarragona site is expected to create 
significant synergies between the chemical companies and to 
enhance the competitiveness of the Tarragona chemical cluster 
as a whole.
4.2.3 Obstacles to overcoming clus-
ter disadvantages
The lack of collaboration between 
companies is perceived by both pro-
ducers and LSPs as the main obstacle 
that stands in the way of overcoming 
the cluster disadvantages.
The prerequisites for any collabora-
tion initiative, such as establishing a 
fair allocation mechanism, finding the 
right partner and mutual trust, appear 
difficult to fulfill. However, the opportu-
nity to share capital investments, mixed 
with the specific needs of the industry, 
has triggered several collaboration 
initiatives within the cluster. The project 
undertaken by chemical companies 
and local authorities to recover water 
for the chemical industry from the 
urban water treatment plant represents 
a key example.
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Figure 4-13 Tarragona - obstacles to overcoming 
cluster disadvantages (green/LSPs, blue/producers)
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CLUSTER
Overcoming water scarcity in Tarragona: 
a collaboration to the benefit of the cluster 
and its surroundings
Water shortage is a critical problem along the Spanish coasts, 
and more generally in the whole Mediterranean area. Tarragona is 
a location where a combination of different factors, including ex-
pansion of the chemical industry, population growth and tourism 
pressure, has increased water consumption to dangerous limits. 
The increasing demand for water, with limited natural resources, 
has even challenged the quality of the water, which has attracted 
the attention of the Catalan government. In this context, a water 
pipeline of about 100 km from the Ebro river to the Tarragona 
area has been constructed. The pipeline, with a capacity of 4 m3/
second, was built to provide water for both industrial and urban 
use, at respectively 60% and 40%.
Since the start up of the line, industry consumption has increased 
from 0.79 m3/second to 1.05 m3/second. Urban demand has 
approximately doubled, due to a population growth in the area by 
40% from 1990 to 2005. Finally, the increase in tourism has satu-
rated the capacity of the pipeline, especially during the months 
of July and August. 
The need to explore new sources of water led the local authori-
ties to embark in 2005 on a project for recovering water from 
the wastewater urban treatment plants. The project required an 
investment of ` 25 million and had the objective of reclaiming 
part of the chemical wastewater intended for industrial use and 
making it available for urban use. Finally, by using recovered 
water for the cooling towers of the chemical plants, an amount 
of 0.57 m3/s of additional water was made available for human 
consumption.
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The project of unifying the current pipelines that dispose of treated 
water into the sea represents another example of collaboration that
has involved all chemical companies in the cluster.
CLUSTER
Exploit synergies in the Tarragona cluster:
the disposal of treated water
The different start-ups of the chemical companies in Tarragona 
and the absence of a cluster coordinating central body can be 
considered the causes of the existence of eight pipelines for dis-
charging treated water into the sea.
Two of these pipelines are in the north industrial park and dis-
charge water from the crackers, the refinery and the chemical 
companies into the sea. The remaining six pipelines are in the 
southern industrial park; one from Asesa inside the port, one 
from Dow and BASF in the central area of the cluster, and the 
remaining in the west part of the cluster.
Following the expansion of the port area, the pipelines for the 
treated water disposal became internal to it. The resulting envi-
ronmental concerns required an urgent solution.
This situation has driven all the chemical companies to invest in 
merging the eight pipelines into one, with a disposal point twice 
as far from the shore (from 1800 m to 3600 m) and at an increased 
depth below the surface (from 22 m to 35 m). All the companies 
active in the cluster have embarked on this project, with a 
contribution proportional to the company’s rate of treated water 
disposal.
Starting in mid 2008, the project is expected to reduce the 
environmental impact of the cluster operation, since moving the 
disposal point to a location deeper and farther away will improve 
the dilution of the treated water with sea water.
The examples of collaboration re-
ported above are clearly triggered by 
the necessity to share capital invest-
ments on assets and infrastructure 
necessary for the manufacturing of 
chemicals. However, when the chemi-
cal companies and the LSPs address 
the lack of collaboration as one of the 
main obstacles overcoming cluster 
disadvantages, with a percentage re-
spectively of 36% and 32%, they mean 
something more than sharing capital 
investments. Both the chemical com-
panies and the LSPs are concerned 
about the necessity of joint action for 
defending and developing the chemi-
cal business interests and lobbying the 
regional and local authorities. Indeed 
23% of the chemical companies and 
14% of the LSPs claim that there is a 
lack of action and of involvement of 
public institutions and local/regional 
governments in supporting further 
development of the chemical cluster 
in Tarragona.
66
67
Styrene plant, Perafort - Tarragona, Repsol
4.2.4 Opportunities for horizontal 
cluster collaboration
Producers and LSPs have mostly 
diverging views on opportunities for 
horizontal collaboration.
Developing logistics infrastructure 
and pooling logistics resources are 
considered most important for LSPs, 
whereas producers consider swap 
arrangements to be crucial. These 
results seem to be in line with the per-
ception of traffic congestion as one of 
the main disadvantages of the Tarra-
gona cluster. As a consequence, LSPs
look at opportunities for more efficient 
logistics solutions, while producers 
are more interested in promoting swap 
arrangements, subject to competition 
law compliance, to decrease the need 
for transporting chemicals from their 
sites in Tarragona to distant custom-
ers. However, the range of products 
suitable for swaps is quite narrow and 
is restricted to base chemicals and 
commodities. Swap arrangements 
are possible in general if the two 
partners are of a comparable market 
size. The difficulty of finding the right 
partner, together with the necessity of 
establishing mutually convenient agree-
ments and the perceived risk of losing 
market share represent significant 
obstacles to the further development of 
swap arrangements.
The willingness to promote operational 
synergies between LSPs in order to de-
velop more efficient logistics solutions 
is clearly demonstrated by the case of 
Pañalon and Transportes Martin, who 
implemented multimodal distribution 
services jointly for container assets.
Figure 4-14 Tarragona - opportunities for horizontal 
cluster collaboration (green/LSPs, blue/producers)
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When LSPs collaborate: 
the Tradilo Multimodal Transport JV
In the cluster of Tarragona the two companies Pañalon and 
Transportes Martín have been active in transporting chemical 
products by road for more than 30 years. In Spain, both companies 
were considered leaders in the market of chemicals transporta-
tion.
In 1999, based on the customers’ increasing demand and the per-
spective of its continuous growth over the following years, the two 
companies decided to join their resources and found Tradilo. The 
objective of the new company was to develop a reliable and flex-
ible plan of multimodal distribution services, based in Tarragona.
Tradilo has quickly developed, together with shipping companies, 
a reliable sea “highway”, connecting Tarragona with almost all the 
big ports of the Mediterranean Sea. The link with Italy has proved 
to be particularly efficient.
Tradilo owns 200 tank containers, dedicated to the transport of 
chemical and petrochemical products, and benefits from the fleets 
of vehicles of both the two founding companies, amounting to a 
total of 1,800 vehicles.
Three years after the foundation of Tradilo, the two companies 
Pañalon and Transportes Martín decided again to join their re-
sources and found a new company, Tradilo Inversiones. The new 
company is a logistic public platform of 130,000 m2, providing 
full complementary services to the chemical transportation com-
panies, such as ADR parking, a container platform, a station of 
6 cleaning lines, a waste treatment plant and all the adminis-
trative services. Tradilo and Tradilo Inversiones have settled in 
the industrial park of Constantí. This location benefits from the 
proximity to customers’ plants (the distance between Tarragona 
and Constantí is about 6 km) and a well developed transport 
infrastructure network (airport in Reus, port of Tarragona, contain-
er railway station and motorway).
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When shippers collaborate: 
the TAPP Mooring case
In 1998, BASF installed a dock in the Port of Tarragona for the 
charge/discharge of bulk chemicals. In recent years, this facility 
was operated at low utilization rates (less than 50% of capacity), 
creating a sizeable operational inefficiency.
In 2003 Dow was planning to install a dock in the Port of Tarra-
gona (next to the existing BASF dock) for the charge/discharge 
of bulk chemicals, and the opportunity for the two companies to 
collaborate was obvious.
BASF sold 50% of the existing dock to Dow, and  in June 2006 
both companies integrated their respective part of the dock into 
a new society, TAPP A.I.E. (Terminal de Atraque de Productos 
Petroquímicos, Asociación de Interés Económico).
The collaboration between BASF and Dow resulted in fully ex-
ploiting the capacity of the dock, while sharing equally the related 
operation and depreciation costs.
The opportunity of increasing asset utilization rate and sharing 
handling costs of bulk chemicals led two other companies, Dow 
Quimica and BASF, to start a joint venture.
Producers and LSPs agree that shar-
ing planning information is an oppor-
tunity for horizontal collaboration. The
possibility for producers to collabora-
tively provide LSPs with planning data 
for logistics services was explored by 
the Tarragona Think Tank. The main 
obstacle to this kind of interaction 
lies in the way chemical companies 
choose their LSPs. Indeed it seems 
that a large part of the demand for 
logistics services is aggregated by 
several chemical producers at a 
company level, and contracts with 
LSPs are drawn up at headquarters. 
Promoting more effective integration 
of local decision makers into central 
decision making and procurement 
processes could represent a large op-
portunity to enhance the efficiency of 
logistics services. Indeed LSPs have 
confirmed that long term contracts, 
and more reliable and complete plan-
ning data from the producers would 
be crucial for providing more efficient 
logistics solutions.
4.2.5 Opportunities for vertical 
cluster collaboration
Producers and LSPs are mostly in 
agreement on opportunities for vertical 
collaboration.
Integration of LSPs in designing Sup-
ply Chain solutions and collaboratively 
sharing planning data are considered 
most important. A tighter integration 
between producers and LSPs has 
already demonstrated several benefits, 
as exemplified by the case of the 
Repsol and Terquimsa collaboration in 
the Ammonia Logistics project.
71
Figure 4-15 Tarragona - opportunities for vertical cluster collaboration 
(green/LSPs, blue/producers)
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Ammonia Logistics: Repsol/Terquimsa 
collaboration
Before 1999, ammonia was delivered to the Tarragona chemi-
cal cluster by sea through the ports of Valencia and Barcelona 
and from there by rail to the Repsol manufacturing plants. The 
absence of cryogenic storage facilities at the port of Tarragona 
prevented the product from being delivered to the port itself. The 
opportunity of reducing the logistics costs and increasing the se-
curity level of the transportation triggered a collaboration initia-
tive between the companies Repsol and Terquimsa.
By installing a cryogenic facility at the port of Tarragona and by 
building a 14 km long pipeline from the port of Tarragona to the 
Repsol chemical plants, the rail deliveries of ammonia have been 
completely discontinued.
Ammonia storage and the pipeline have been fully operative 
since the end of 1999. The project has benefited both parties 
involved, especially in terms of increased safety, and flexibility of 
the procurement process. The project resulted then in a consist-
ent release of logistic assets (Rail Tank Cars), up to 1400 RTC/
year.
LSPs are also interested in a more 
rational use of transportation modes. 
However, lack of flexibility, limited net-
work access, and poor service quality 
still prevent chemical companies from 
choosing rail or water-based trans-
portation modes. In this context, it 
appears that the export of chemicals 
from the port of Tarragona could be 
improved. Insufficient export through-
put does not justify regular shipping 
lines, especially for containers, and 
many companies are forced to use the 
more flexible port of Barcelona, which 
has the disadvantage of being almost 
100 km away and therefore of adding 
unnecessary logistics costs.
4.2.6 Who should lead the develop-
ment of the cluster?
Producers and LSPs are in agreement 
that the cluster requires leadership. 
In order to develop the long-term vision 
for the chemical cluster in Tarragona, 
the think tank focused on the need to 
investigate the formation of a stake-
holder driven model.
This model would consist of three dif-
ferent tiers:
UÊ -*Ã]Ê*À`ÕViÀÃÊ>`ÊV>É,i}>Ê
authorities on the operational or 
implementation level
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Figure 4-16 Tarragona - cluster development leadership 
(green/LSPs, blue/shippers)
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UÊ ÊiÜÞÊvÀi`Ê-Õ««ÞÊ
>ÊÀÕ«Ê
and the Port, Road, Rail authorities/
Infrastructure Companies on the 
coordination level
UÊ Ê
ÕÃÌiÀÊi>`iÀ]ÊL>Ãi`ÊÊ>Ê`iÊÌÊ
be agreed by the stakeholders 
The activities/roles of the various par-
ties in the model would be:
UÊ -Õ««ÞÊ
>ÊvÀ>ÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀiÊ`iÛi«-
ment and operation is the domain of 
the Port, Road, Rail or Infrastructure 
Companies together with the Produc-
ers and Local/Regional Authorities
UÊ -Õ««ÞÊ
>ÊÌi}À>ÌÊÃÊÌiÊ
domain of the LSPs, Producers and a 
Supply Chain Group to be formed (it 
is anticipated that the SC Group will 
consist of representatives from all 
key stakeholders)
UÊ «iiÌ>ÌÊvÊÌiÊVÕÃÌiÀÊvÀ>-
structure, coordination and operation 
strategies is the domain of the LSPs,
SC Group, Producers, Port, Road, 
Rail  authorities, and Local authori-
ties
UÊ /iÊVÕÃÌiÀÊi>`iÀÊ­iÛÃ>}i`Ê>ÃÊ>Ê
public-private partnership between 
the stakeholders) is responsible for 
creating the vision and strategy for 
the cluster which is then implement-
ed as above.
Defining what decision-making powers 
this cluster leader would be vested with 
would be a further step. It emerged 
from the interviews that the issue 
of land scarcity is one of the priori-
ties that the cluster leader would be 
encouraged to address, since the 
opportunities of further development 
for the cluster in Tarragona appear to 
depend very much on this.
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Figure 4-17: Proposed Tarragona stakeholder model
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5. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CLUSTERS
IN ANTWERP, ROTTERDAM, THE RHINE/RUHR
REGION, AND TARRAGONA
5.1 Raw material and competitive
feedstock
The clusters in Antwerp, Rotterdam
and Tarragona have developed around
their respective ports. Indeed the port 
represents the principal access point 
to raw materials and competitive 
feedstock for the manufacturing of 
chemicals. Significant quantities of 
crude oil and natural gas find their way
to the Ruhr region (ChemSite cluster) via
other sources: crude oil via a pipeline
from Rotterdam and Wilhelmshaven; 
and natural gas via the German pipeline
network. The Ruhr region, although land-
locked, is well connected to the seaports 
of Rotterdam and Antwerp due to the
nearby river Rhine and the inland water-
ways. The importance of the necessary 
inputs for the manufacturing processes 
within the cluster is underlined by the
results of the interviews, where the avail-
ability of raw materials and competitive
feedstock is considered by almost one
third of the companies as one of the 
main advantages of the clusters.
5.2 Exports
The impact of the port on the eco-
nomic success of the chemical clusters 
is considered fundamental for exports 
as well. The ports of Antwerp and Rot-
terdam are extensively exploited for 
shipping outgoing containers. In some 
cases, the Tarragona throughput does 
not reach a sufficient volume to justify 
regular shipping lines. It therefore often 
occurs that companies ship contain-
ers from the port of Barcelona instead 
of Tarragona, thus adding unnecessary 
logistics costs and contributing to traffic
congestion. Investments in the area 
could increase the throughput of the 
port exports and pave the way for the 
development of more regular shipping 
lines.
The Think Tank discussions revealed
that both import and export activities 
of the clusters made better coordina-
tion of legislation on VAT, customs 
and security between Belgium, The 
Netherlands and Germany a must 
for the ARRR mega-cluster. These 
discussions stressed also the impor-
tance of the coordinated development 
of suitable container infrastructure 
in and around the clusters as well as 
from the clusters to the hinterland.
Figure 5-1 compares the clusters in Ant-
werp, Rotterdam, the Ruhr region and 
Tarragona along several critical dimen-
sions, such as the link between industry
and government, land ownership, and 
cluster growth opportunities.
Plant, Krefeld - Uerdingen, Bayer
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Figure 5-1 Comparison between the four clusters in Antwerp, Rotterdam, Ruhr 
region (ChemSite cluster) and Tarragona along several critical dimensions
Port of Rotterdam Authority ChemSite
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staffed by the local/regional government
to coordinate interest in the development 
and operation of ports.
ChemSite is a public-private partner-
ship launched by the chemical industry, 
the state of North Rhine-Westphalia and 
local authorities in the Ruhr region. It
forms an umbrella for all activities in the 
chemical industry value stream in the
region. 
Tarragona does not benefit from a spe-
cific partnership between local industry
and government with respect to chemi-
cal operations.
5.5 Land ownership
Land ownership also plays a role 
in the governance of the cluster as 
expansion investments can only be 
performed if attractive land parcels 
are made available.
In Rotterdam, the Port Authority is the 
owner of the land. Usually, land in port 
areas cannot be bought by the chemi-
cal companies but is leased for long
periods, from 20 to 50 years. The Port
of Rotterdam Authority is engaged, 
together with the Dutch government, in
projects for increasing land availability. 
The project Maasvlakte 2, which involves 
the reclamation of new land from the 
North Sea at the western end of the port, 
is a key example.
5.3 Logistics
The importance of the logistics serv-
ices offered by the cluster is different 
in the four areas considered.
In the case of Rotterdam and Antwerp,
the ports are responsible for the mari-
time traffic but are also involved in the
maintenance and development of the 
cluster infrastructure.
In the Ruhr region, ChemSite offers the 
chemical companies highly developed
chemical parks and sites with sophisti-
cated infrastructure, tailor-made services
and integrated material supply systems. 
The Port Authority of Tarragona has the 
function of managing the imports and 
exports of cargo through the port, but is
not involved in projects on infrastructure 
maintenance and development. These
activities remain mainly a prerogative of 
the chemical companies.
5.4 Authorities
The involvement of the local authori-
ties and the regional government in 
the chemical industry constitutes 
a further element of differentiation 
between the four areas.
The Port Authorities of Antwerp and 
Rotterdam are government-owned 
corporations, therefore appointed and
81
Tarragona cluster: 53% of the chemical 
companies interviewed in Tarragona have 
raised the problem of land availability, 
whereas in ARRR only 13% of the com-
panies interviewed are concerned about 
this issue.
Figure 5-2 shows a typical case in Tar-
ragona of a chemical company whose 
owned land is less than 50% exploited.
In the case of Antwerp, the land is 
owned by several stakeholders, i.e. the 
Port Authority, private companies and 
local government. The availability of 
land within the Antwerp port area, both 
greenfield and on host sites, is the result 
of a deliberate strategy from the Belgian 
government and local and port authori-
ties. Since the 1950s, they have called 
for land clearance on both sides of the 
river Schelde and have mapped out 
industrial zones.
ChemSite offers about 240 hectares of 
vacant industrial land to new compa-
nies at a total of seven chemical parks 
and sites in the Ruhr region. The land is 
owned by industry partners. The sites 
vary between fully developed petro-
chemical, base and specialty chemical, 
high-technology and chemical process-
ing locations, both greenfield and 
brownfield sites. New companies can 
be integrated into the comprehensive 
materials flow system, can share the in-
frastructure with other companies on site 
and can make use of all kinds of services 
available on site.
In Tarragona the land is owned by the 
chemical companies. The unoccupied by 
the chemical companies, which amounts 
to more than 50% of their land, can only 
be exploited with their agreement. From 
the results of the interviews, we see 
that the lack of land availability is con-
sidered the principal disadvantage of the 
Figure 5-2 Land under-utilization 
due to misaligned incentives
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In conclusion, the differences between 
the four areas can be summarized to 
one main dimension : centralization of 
the development initiatives. While the
northern European clusters benefit from 
the efforts of Port or cluster authorities 
to push the development of their respec-
tive clusters, Tarragona still suffers from 
the absence of a central coordination 
body initiating collaboration initiatives
and attracting investments. Having
said this, the study still points out the 
difficulties experienced by all cluster 
stakeholders in getting information 
which enables them to obtain a clear 
picture of the flows and thus iden-
tify opportunities. Given the variety of 
independent firms acting in the cluster,
retrieving and managing cluster-relevant
information is a challenge that still needs
to be addressed.
The mega-cluster ARRR is decentral-
ized.  Discussions in the Think Tank 
revealed the need for a co-operation 
platform between the subclusters of 
Antwerp, Rotterdam and Rhine-Ruhr.
In addition to owning all or part of the 
land, the Port Authorities in Rotter-
dam and Antwerp play the role of land
brokers. Subject to the business of 
new investors, they have the necessary
experience to propose strategic loca-
tions for the supply of raw materials and 
the integration of their operations with
other cluster players. ChemSite provides
a comprehensive “one-stop-shop” for
new investors and acts as a land broker
on behalf of its industrial partners in the
Ruhr region.
In Tarragona there is no central unit
that assumes the role of land broker. As
owners of the land, chemical companies,
and only they, have the right to rent on 
an individual basis their unexploited land
to potential investors.
In Rotterdam and Antwerp, the Port
Authorities actively coordinate strategic
initiatives with stakeholders in the port. 
They act as chemical cluster leaders,
lobbying the government on develop-
ment initiatives. ChemSite leads the 
cluster in the Ruhr region and is respon-
sible for formulating long-term cluster 
development strategy in collaboration 
with stakeholders and shareholders. In
Tarragona the cluster growth depends
on initiatives of individual companies
promoting their sites for investments.
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6. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
The co-existence of competition 
and collaboration is a key feature 
and strength of European chemical 
clusters. The competition within and 
between chemical clusters benefits all 
stakeholders. Shippers benefit from a 
greater range of alternatives to design 
and operate their networks. LSPs enjoy 
the advantage of a larger, local market 
while potential investors benefit from 
competing cluster authorities investing 
to further attract new cluster partici-
pants. Despite the competitive inten-
sity, collaboration is being increasingly 
recognized as the next frontier to mas-
ter interdependencies and maximize 
efficiencies in the supply chain. The 
many caselets throughout this report 
are evidence of the fact that supply 
chain collaborations (recommended 
by the previous think tank reports) are 
increasingly being explored. Never-
theless, considering the supply chain 
issues discussed in this report, we con-
clude that there is still significant room 
for improvement. This section of the 
report will make recommendations and 
propose solutions, which if adopted, 
will go a long way to ensuring that ad-
ditional benefits in chemical clusters 
can be continuously achieved. 
6.1 Manage cluster information to 
identify opportunities
UÊOrganized information sharing 
between all stakeholders should be 
put in place to improve cluster op-
erations. Information sharing is not 
simply a case of producers providing 
forecasts to service providers. The 
willingness to create common knowl-
edge about capacities and flows in 
the cluster will create an awareness 
of the potential efficiencies and will 
drive market initiatives towards the 
discovery of more opportunities than 
are known currently. In many cases, 
the existing asset base could be 
much better utilized. Cluster-wide 
issues such as traffic congestion 
(Antwerp/Rotterdam, Tarragona) 
or suboptimal land use (Tarragona) 
might require significant investments 
in the future. Authorities, i.e. cluster 
authorities, national and local gov-
ernments and the European Com-
mission (DG Enterprise, DG Energy
and Transport) are willing to support 
the chemical industry in this, but 
require the best information available 
to value investment proposals that 
cannot be carried by listed compa-
nies. Consequently, authorities must 
become partners in the informa-
tion sharing process and become 
partners in the development of the 
European chemical clusters.
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6.2 Provide a platform to discuss 
cluster opportunities
UÊ Ê/Ê/>Ê«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÊÕ>-
mously agree on the urgent need for 
the chemical clusters to be effec-
tively managed and to set up an 
appropriate organization to imple-
ment a suitable management system. 
Operating in clusters is complex 
considering the interdependencies 
between manufacturers, service 
providers and authorities. Information 
sharing is key to the coordination of 
actions within the clusters. How-
ever, both for the Tarragona cluster 
and for the mega-cluster Antwerp-
Rotterdam and Rhine/Ruhr, no single 
coordinating body is currently active 
to support cluster-related informa-
tion exchange. Therefore, the Think 
Tank recommends, for Tarragona 
and ARRR, the creation of a working 
group bringing all relevant cluster 
stakeholders together in order to 
ensure that the recommendations 
mentioned above become reality. 
Otherwise, the isolated initiatives will 
not exploit the benefits of the chemi-
cal clusters.
UÊ /iÊ`iViÌÀ>âi`Ê}ÛiÀ>ViÊvÊÌiÊ
European clusters (Chapter 5) calls 
for a working group relying on volun-
tary participation of manufacturers, 
LSPs and authorities.
6.3 Take common actions to exploit 
cluster opportunities
UÊ /iÊ,,,ÊVÕÃÌiÀÊÃ«>ÃÊÌÀiiÊ
countries that are, despite EU-wide
directives, not fully aligned in terms 
of legislation. Since this lack of 
harmonization creates unnecessary 
transaction costs, the Think Tank 
participants strongly recommend an 
identical implementation of EU-leg-
islation by the Belgian, Dutch and 
German states. This encompasses 
especially VAT harmonization and 
customs-related as well as security 
legislation. This can be worked out in 
the scope of the cluster platform to 
be created. Over a longer term, this 
type of co-ordination and harmoniza-
tion between different clusters could 
be extended to all chemical clusters 
in Europe.
UÊ /Ê/>Ê«>ÀÌV«>ÌÃÊÃÕ««ÀÌÊÌiÊ
development of infrastructure link-
ing all European chemical clusters
so that the European Chemical 
Industry can effectively continue to 
compete with other regions in the 
world such as the US Gulf Coast. The 
set up of a specific working group
for that purpose is suggested.
UÊ ÀiÊi«>ÃÃÊÃÕ`ÊLiÊ}ÛiÊÌÊ
the development of appropriate im-
port/export container facilities facili-
tating massive imports and exports 
as well as the transportation of the 
containers to the customers located 
in the hinterland of the clusters.
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6.4 Long-term relationships are 
more profitable than short-term 
benefits
The former EPCA reports have been 
actively promoting long-term collabo-
rations between shippers and service 
providers for the benefit of both. The 
Think Tank members acknowledge 
the progress that has been made, as 
shown by some caselets in this report, 
since the first EPCA report in 2004 
but the interviews show that there is 
still a gap between what the chemical 
industry says and what is practiced. 
The Think Tank therefore makes the 
following recommendations.
UÊ Shippers should develop long-term 
relationships with selected logistics 
providers, allowing them the possi-
bility of fulfilling the collaborative role 
that producers expect from LSPs (i.e. 
proactive, forward-looking, flexible 
and highly competitive). Traditional 
confrontational relationships be-
tween shippers and service providers 
encourage market fragmentation, 
with the result that many LSPs are 
too small to cover a large propor-
tion of a single shipper’s demand for 
logistics services. Manufacturers fuel 
this fragmentation through frequent 
tendering rounds and cherry-picking 
at several suppliers. This competitive 
intensity often prevents the realiza-
tion of synergies between LSPs (such 
as merging shipments in multimodal 
hubs), and consequently undermines 
efforts to reduce the carbon footprint 
in chemical supply chains. Clearly the 
development of long-term relation-
ships with a limited set of partners 
provides the opportunity for service 
providers to develop the logistics 
solutions producers are seeking.
UÊ ÊÀ`iÀÊÌÊVÛViÊÃ««iÀÃÊvÊÌiÊ
benefits of long-term relationships, 
LSPs will have to put greater em-
phasis on their ability to think stra-
tegically and to implement  strategy 
in a pro-active way. Manufacturers 
often perceive service providers as 
operators and do not involve them in 
their strategic and tactical planning 
processes. A paradigm shift starts 
with the design of contracts which 
give a greater degree of freedom but 
also higher responsibilities to LSPs.
These contracts should however en-
courage LSPs to pro-actively develop 
cluster- and Europe-wide services 
instead of condemning them to react 
at each tendering round.
UÊ Ê}Ài>ÌiÀÊi«>ÃÃÊÊdeveloping
coordination skills and high level 
generalists trained in strategic 
thinking and planning is the recom-
mendation to attain this goal for both 
producers and LSPs. 85
Rail sliding on the Cologne site, INEOS
The European chemical sector has 
some of the strongest industrial clus-
ters in the world. Its future is bright, 
provided it manages to strongly build 
on these clusters, for instance by ena-
bling successful supply chain collabo-
ration. Other sectors, like automobiles 
and consumer electronics have led 
the way, and showed that competi-
tion and collaboration can effectively 
co-exist, to the benefit of all stakehold-
ers. However, the groundwork needs 
to be laid out first. It consists of basics 
like information exchange, discussion 
platforms, collaborative end-to-end 
solution development, and a long-term 
perspective on cluster development.
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Botlek and Pernis area, Port of Rotterdam
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7. APPENDIX
Organization of the study
From September 2006 to August 2007, 
EPCA set up a Think Tank dedicated to 
two chemical cluster areas in Europe.
The Think Tank consisted of a Steering
Group and two sub-groups of chemical 
managers, each dedicated to a specific 
cluster. The ARRR (Antwerp, Rotterdam,
Rhine/Ruhr area) group examined the
transnational cluster covering parts of 
Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany. 
The other group examined the Tarragona 
cluster located in the North of Spain.
Each group was composed of repre-
sentatives of EPCA member companies, 
designated or invited by the EPCA
board, and supply chain researchers 
from INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France.
The ARRR Think Tank meetings took 
place in Brussels, and the Tarragona 
Think Tank took place in the offices of 
several companies of this cluster. The 
ARRR Think Tank had 7 meetings while 
the Tarragona members met 6 times,
with a high level of attendance. 
The first Think Tank sessions contrib-
uted to the determination of a relevant
cluster charter, to the definition of cluster 
boundaries and to the issues faced by
the clusters. Based on the result of the
discussions, INSEAD drafted a ques-
tionnaire and interviewed 53 persons,
shared between the ARRR and the
Tarragona cluster and between produc-
ers and service providers. The majority
of the persons interviewed were also 
participating to the Think Tank meetings, 
while the remaining part was suitably
selected among industry experts of the 
respective cluster. The later Think Tank 
meetings served the purpose of com-
menting on both the statistical results 
of these interviews and the anonymous 
statements made during them. Together 
the results and the comments provided
a basis from which to discuss the issues 
raised, understand their origin and find 
ways to tackle them.
From this process description, it should
be clear that the report, at best, presents
the collective views of the participat-
ing experts. It is neither a scientific
document nor a fully representative
account of all relevant industry experts. 
Nevertheless, the process followed 
was sufficiently rigorous and we are
confident that the report does provide a
solid baisis for discussion and, hopefully, 
action.
88
The Steering Group (SG) had a major role in initiating the process and moni-
toring the Think Tank discussions. The Steering Group was composed as fol-
lows:
U Frank Andreesen (Bayer)
U Hans-Jörg Bertschi (Bertschi)
U Phil Browitt (Agility)
U Cathy Demeestere (EPCA)
U Fred du Plessis (ECSPP)
U Antonio Gomis (Repsol YPF), replaced later by Benjamin Palomo (Repsol YPF)
U Paul Gooch (The Logical Group)
U Alfred Heuser (BASF)
U Baptiste Lebreton (INSEAD)
U Paolo Letizia (INSEAD)
U Graham van’t Hoff (Shell)
U Luk Van Wassenhove (INSEAD, Chairman)
ARRR cluster
U Ronald Backers (Port of Rotterdam)
U Thomas Bode (RAG Degussa)
U Cathy Demeestere (EPCA)
U Johan Devos (Bertschi)
U Hans de Willigen (VOPAK)
U Bas Ensink op Kemna (SABIC)
U Danny Eyckmans (Shell)
U Paul Gooch (The Logical Group, Chair-
man)
U Margarete Gersemann (ChemSite)
U Bertrand Gyselynck (Total Petrofina)
U Joris Hurenkamp (Port of Rotterdam)
U Eric Janssens (Port of Antwerp)
U Baptiste Lebreton (INSEAD)
U Fabian Leroy (Katoen Natie)
U Paolo Letizia (INSEAD)
U Angela Neu Meij (BASF)
U Susanne Ramp (Hoyer)
U Peter Rose (INEOS Olefines)
U Phillip Schneider (Reederei Jaegers)
U Bernhard Schnittger (European Com-
mission)
U Xavier Van Rolleghem (Port of Antwerp)
U Peter Viebig (Bayer)
U Mark Warner (Den Hartogh)
U Aernoud Willeumier (Port of Rotterdam)
Tarragona cluster
U Josep Andreu (Transport Prats)
U Manuel Arce (Ercros)
U Javier Bort (AEQT, Chairman)
U Josep Maria Chillida (BASF)
U Genoveva Climent (Port of Tarragona)
U José Curado (BASF)
U Fred du Plessis (ECSPP)
U Michael Euler (Schmidt Iberica)
U Antonio Gomis (Repsol YPF)
U Luis Jove (Bayer)
U Erik Klonhammer (Katoen Natie)
U Paolo Letizia (INSEAD)
U Jesus Loma (Bayer)
U Cesar Meler (Repsol YPF)
U Sebastian Mussini (Repsol YPF)
U Juan Carlos Nebot (Bayer)
U Cesar Nunez (Solvay)
U Ed op den Camp (SABIC)
U Josep Pallares (Universita Rovira i 
Virgili)
U Benjamin Palomo (Repsol YPF)
U Rose-Marie Pype (ECTA)
U Aurora Sanchez (Panalon)
U Jan Schoonbaert (VOPAK)
U Cesar Valdes (Dow Chemical)
U Salvador Vidal Rodriguez (Bayer)
The two Think Tank groups were composed as follows:
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ADR International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road
AEQT Tarragone Chemical Business Association
ARG Aethylen Rohrleitungsgesellschaft mbH & Co.KG
(Ethylene Pipeline Company – not a strict translation) 
ARRR Antwerp Rotterdam Rhine Ruhr
C4 Cut Effluent from steam cracking containing Butadiene and
Isobutene
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CMI Customer Managed Inventory
EPCA European Petrochemical Association
EPDC European Pipeline Development Corporation
HPPO Hydrogen Peroxide Propylene Oxide. A cooperation
between Dow, BASF, and Solvay
HSSE Health, Safety, Security, and Environment
INSEAD Institut Europeen d’Administration des Affaires
LNG Liquified Natural Gas
LSP Logistics Service Provider
NRW North Rhine-Westphalia
ROCE Return on Capital Employed
RTC Rail Tank Car
VMI Vendor Managed Inventory
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In addition to delivering content, the
Think Tank sessions were pleasant and
were characterized by mutual respect
and fellowship, so typical for the chemi-
cal industry. It rapidly became clear 
during the meetings that European
chemical players are not only clustering 
industrially, but that they are also good
at networking, generating through the
meetings dynamics of creativity and
readiness for a mindset shift from the
competition model to other business 
models integrating a partnership ap-
proach.
The many examples in the report show
that to some extent collaborative 
models already exist, as suggested in
the 2004 and 2005 Think Tank reports.
The recommendations of the Think Tank
however also show that a lot remains to 
be done to optimize supply chain and
chemical clustering in Europe in order to
safeguard a sustainable and competitive
European chemical business community.
So let us all work on turning recommen-
dations into action!
We hope you enjoyed reading this report
as much as we all enjoyed making it for 
you.
Cathy Demeestere
Secretary General EPCA.
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